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Abstract: Compensation for damage caused to patients by vaccination is an increas-
ingly prominent issue given the important public health consideration of ensuring
the highest possible take-up of vaccination. This study explores the approach to
vaccine damage cases in four different European countries (France, Germany, Italy
and the UK), examining the variety of different mechanisms for providing redress,
including specific compensation funds, social security systems, the operation of
orthodox regimes of tort law and product liability, as well as in certain jurisdictions
bespoke legislation for healthcare products or pharmaceuticals. The authors then go
on to examine the recent case law on this topic at a Member State and European
level, focussing particularly on issues relating to the notion of defect and that of
causation in vaccine damage cases.
Zusammenfassung: Der Ersatz von Impfschäden gewinnt angesichts des Bestrebens,
zur Sicherung der Volksgesundheit eine möglichst hohe Impfdichte zu erreichen,
ständig an Bedeutung. Diese Studie untersucht die Herangehensweise an Impfschäden
in vier EU-Mitgliedstaaten (Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und Italien),
indem sie die verschiedenen Mechanismen, den Geschädigten Ersatz zu verschaffen,
analysiert, darunter spezielle Entschädigungsfonds, sozialrechtliche Instrumente, klas-
sisches Delikts- und Produkthaftungsrecht und schließlich sektorspezifische
Gesetzgebung. Zudem erörtern die Autoren die jüngste Rechtsprechung auf mitglied-
staatlicher wie auf EU-Ebene, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Fehlerbegriffs
und der Kausalität in Impfschadensfällen.
Résumé: La réparation des dommages causés par les vaccins est une question majeure,
compte tenu notamment de l’objectif de santé publique visant à obtenir une couverture
vaccinale aussi large que possible de la population. Cette étude s’intéresse à la manière
dont sont appréhendés les dommages imputés aux vaccins dans quatre pays européens
(l’Allemagne, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Italie) et envisage différents mécanismes
d’indemnisation, en particulier les fonds d’indemnisation, la sécurité sociale, les règles de
droit commun de la responsabilité civile ainsi que les règles spéciales applicables aux
produits de santé et aux médicaments dans certains pays. Les auteurs se penchent
* A final version of this contribution was submitted on 31 December 2017.
** Professor of Civil Law, University of Piemonte Orientale, Italy. Email: erajneri@hotmail.it.
Professor of Private Law, Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France. Email: Jean-Sebastien.
Borghetti@u-paris2.fr. Senior Research Fellow in Comparative Law, British Institute of
International and Comparative Law and Professeur Associé, Université de Paris Dauphine PSL.
Email: d.fairgrieve@BIICL.ORG. Professor of Civil Law, European Private Law and Consumer
Law, University of Kassel, Germany. Email: rott@uni-kassel.de.
European Review of Private Law 1-2018 [57–96] © 2018 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands.
57
également sur la jurisprudence en la matière, au niveau national et européen,
s’intéressant particulièrement à la notion de défaut et à la caractérisation du lien de
causalité dans les affaires relatives aux dommages attribués aux vaccins.
KeyWords: Vaccination - product liability - burden of proof - defectiveness - causation
1. Introduction (Eleonora Rajneri)
1 Within the spectrum of potential claims for loss caused by defective products,
the question of vaccine damage is of a very particular nature. The objective of
vaccinations is to induce immunity to disease by administering killed or attenuated
pathogens, thereby leading to the creation of antibodies in the immunized person
which protect against the disease. It is accepted that there are risks associated with
vaccinations, such as the limited possibility of adverse reactions. The great majority
of those who suffer adverse reactions are simply afflicted by mild, transient illness.
In some other cases, a small number of those who are vaccinated suffer adverse
reactions which can lead to severe disability.
Given the public health desire in ensuring the highest take-up of vaccina-
tion, there is a strong argument that special considerations should apply to those
who have been injured following immunization. Indeed, compensation for injuries
caused by vaccines is a particularly sensitive topic in Europe because it involves
important public health issues going beyond the individual interests of the parties.
First, it concerns the consideration of social solidarity in favour of those families
that are suddenly facing a serious and unpredictable disease affecting (generally)
their children. Second, there is the need to reduce as much as possible the distrust
of vaccines, which is the cause of a worrying decrease in voluntary vaccinations and
the consequent return of some endemic diseases.1 There is also the additional
factor that excessive litigation might result in an inhibition of the investment in
research and development by pharmaceutical manufacturers.2
National judges solving these cases deal with the uncertain notion of caus-
ality and the ambiguous notion of defectiveness, in the lack of unequivocal scien-
tific evidences.
1 Under this concern, the Italian Parliament has recently passed a controversial law that increases
the compulsory vaccines from 4 to 10 (gratuitously provided by the State) in addition to 4 vaccines
strongly recommended (L. n. 119/2017). In May 2012, the 194 Member States of the World
Health Assembly endorsed the global vaccination action plan (http://www.who.int/immunization/
global_vaccine_action_plan/GVAP_doc_2011_2020/en/).
2 Although the vaccine market is a global oligopoly controlled by four major manufacturers insulated
from the constraints of a competitive market, as it is shown in the detailed studies on vaccines
market recently conducted by the Italian Antitrust Authority (Autorità Garante) (http://www.agcm.
it/component/joomdoc/allegati-news/IC50_testo.pdf/download.html).
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2 This article explores the approach to vaccine damage cases in four different
European countries, taking into account that all legal systems provide different
mechanism of redress, each of them having its own purpose complementary to the
others and differently interacting with one another.3
Firstly, there is the regulatory system that aims at the prevention of mass
torts. The regulator authorizes the distribution of the vaccine if the benefits for the
community outweigh the costs, even though the vaccine may have collateral effects
in some cases.
Second, as a counterbalance, there is the public or private compensation
fund, which undertakes a solidarity function by awarding redress to the unlucky
victims of the unavoidable side effects of a vaccine. The underlying idea is that,
whenever an individual has to suffer a sacrifice for the benefit of the community,
then the community has the duty to compensate him. This principle is generally
accepted whenever the vaccine is compulsory; it is questioned when the vaccine is
not compulsory, though strongly recommended by the Government.
In between these two approaches, there is tort law (and specifically product
liability law), which has both the function of compensation in favour of the victims
and of deterrence towards the one responsible for the damage, i.e. the party which
could possibly have avoided the damage at the lower cost than the other could.
However, when the risk of damage is unavoidable by both parties and therefore
none of the two can be blamed, the judge has to make a policy decision. Either he
implements the social solidarity issue by charging the manufacturer with the
obligation to compensate the damages caused by his product, irrespectively of
fault; or he exempts the manufacturer from liability, for the reason that his product
is not defective since it is beneficial for the entire community following a general
cost/benefit analysis.
3 The pertinence of this enquiry is reinforced by the fact that vaccine damage has
been the subject of litigation to the highest level, with a preliminary reference from
France to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the recent case of Sanofi Pasteur
concerning the long-running litigation in France for hepatitis B vaccination giving
rise to demyelinating disease.4 In that case, the French judge asked whether Article 4
3 F. CAFAGGI, ‘A Coordinated Approach to Regulation and Civil Liability in European law’, in
F. Cafaggi (ed.), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2006), XV/2.
4 The first case decided by the French Cour de cassation dates back to 2003: Cour de cassation,
première chambre civile (Cass civ 1re), 23 September 2003, nos 01-13063 and 01-13064,
D (Dalloz) 2003, p 2579, note L. NEYRET = D 2004, p 898, note Y.M. SERINET & R. MISLAWSKI =
D. 2004, 1344, obs. D. MAZEAUD = JCP G (La Semaine Juridique - Edition Générale) 2003, II,
p 10179, note N. JONQUET et al = JCP 2004, I, 101, no 23, obs. G. VINEY = Resp civ assur
(Responsabilité civil et assurances) 2003, chron 28, note C. RADÉ = RTD civ (Revue trimestrielle
de droit civil) 2004, 101, obs. P. JOURDAIN. Since that date, at least a dozen cases have come before
the higher court.
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of Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability should be interpreted as precluding
national judges from assessing causation through presumptions. The reply of the ECJ
is interesting from the perspectives of both causation and the notion of defect.5 The
ECJ held that since Directive 85/374/EEC does not contain any definition of the
concept of ‘causal relationship’ within the meaning of Articles 1 and 4, the ECJ
leaves its ascertainment to the individual Member States, following the principle of
procedural autonomy. Consequently, the ECJ affirms that whenever the national
judge ascertains the causal link among the vaccine and the disease following its
own procedural rules, then ‘the vaccine therefore does not offer the safety that one is
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, as provided for in Article 6
of that directive, because it causes abnormal and particularly serious damage to the
patient who, in the light of the nature and function of the product, is entitled to
expect a particularly high level of safety’ (paragraph 41). Indeed, it is striking that
the Court does not mention at all the general cost benefit analysis, which is applied
in some jurisdictions, like Germany. Since this point of the judgment is just an obiter
dictum, it might not have a direct influence to future decisions on the matter.
However, it is extremely relevant because the application or the disapplication of
the benefit cost analysis raises two opposite solutions of the very same case.
2. The Vaccines Case Law in the Italian Legal System (Eleonora
Rajneri)
2.1. The Public Compensation Fund
4 In Italy, the bulk of cases on vaccines are brought before the judge under the
Law N°210/92, which set up a public compensation fund to provide redress for
side effects caused by compulsory vaccinations, and loss deriving from infected
blood transfusions. Following the intervention of the Italian Constitutional Court,
the fund awards redress also in cases where a vaccination is not compulsory, but is
merely recommended by the Government.6 The redress provided by the fund is an
‘indemnity’ and is lower than full compensation.7 In order to be entitled to get the
indemnity, the claimant has the burden of proving causation.
5 ECJ 21 June 2017, C–621/15 N. W and Others v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC and Others.
6 Corte Cost. 23–26 February 1998, n. 27; Corte Cost. 9–16 October 2000, n. 417 (R. CARANTA,
‘Danni da vaccinazione e responsabilità dello Stato’, Resp. civ. e prev. (Responsibilità Civile e
Previdenza), fasc. 6, 1998, p 1352).
7 The indemnity awarded could be approximately between € 750 and 850 a month, according to the
specific disease. In case of more than one disease a further indemnity could be awarded una
tantum. In case of death, the more close relatives are awarded € 150.000,00 in total (although
they were not financially dependent from the deceased).
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2.2. The Proof of Causation Before an Italian Civil Court
5 The legal concept of causation is not defined by the legislator, despite the fact
that causation is, according to the comparatist Gino Gorla, ‘a function of our minds
and not a quid in rerum natura’.8 The statutory provisions on causation are very
limited. The two main ones are in the criminal code (Arts 40 and 41 c.p.),9 while
the civil code simply states that the victim should be compensated for those
damages which are ‘immediate and direct consequences’ of a wrongful act (Art.
1223 c.c.).10
Even though civil courts usually refer to the criminal law provisions, the Italian
Supreme court has made it clear that the proof required in order to ascertain causation
is not the same in a criminal or in a civil case.11 In criminal cases, the proof has to
reach a degree of certainty close to 100%, while in civil claims, it is sufficient to prove
that the cause alleged by the claimant is the most probable one, compared to the other
possible causes brought to the attention of the court.12 Italian civil courts do not
8 G. GORLA, ‘Sulla cosiddetta causalità giuridica: “fatto danno e conseguenza”’, Riv. Dir. Comm.
(Rivista del Diritto Commerciale) 1951, I, p 405. Among the vast Italian literature on causation,
see: F. ANTOLISEI, Il rapporto di causalità nel diritto penale (Torino: Giappichelli 1960) p 105;
M. CAPECCHI, Il nesso di causalità (Padova: CEDAM 2002); P. FORCHIELLI, Il rapporto di causalità
nell’illecito civile (Padova: CEDAM 1960); M. INFANTINO, La causalità nella responsabilità extra-
contrattuale (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2012); P.G. MONATERI, La responsabilità civile
(Torino: UTET 1998); G.E. NAPOLI, Il nesso causale come elemento costitutivo del fatto illecito
(Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2012); P. TRIMARCHI, Causalità e danno (Milano: Giuffrè
1967). For the latest updated comparative analysis on causation: M. INFANTINO & E. ZERVOGIANNI,
Causation in European Tort Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017).
9 Art. 40 c.p.: ‘No one may be punished for an act foreseen by the law as a crime, if the harmful
event, which integrates the crime, is not the consequence of his action or omission.
Not preventing an event, which someone has the legal duty to prevent, is equivalent to causing
it.’
Art. 41 c.p.: ‘The concurrence of preexisting or simultaneous or supervening causes, even if
independent from the action or omission of the person at fault, does not rule out the causal
relationship between the act or omission and the event.
The supervening causes exclude the causality link when they were in themselves sufficient to
determine the event. In this case, if the act or omission previously committed is in itself an offense,
it will be punished.
The same shall apply even when the preexisting or simultaneous or supervening cause is due
to somebody else’s tort.’
10 Gorla explained that the legal provision on the immediate and direct consequences has the
function not to put at the charge of the wrongdoer all the consequences of his action. ‘(T)he
ratio is to avoid making unbearable the risk of action’, since every action implies some risks. See
G. GORLA, Riv. Dir. Comm. 1951, p 405.
11 Cass. civ., 16 October 2007, n. 21619, Corriere giuridico 2008, p 35.
12 The reason for this difference of approach is because the aims of the two procedures are not the
same and therefore the attention of the respective courts is not equally focused on the same matter.
In a criminal court, the attention is given in priority to the defendant (which should not be
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measure the degree of probability necessary to satisfy the burden of proof in respect of
causation. It is a question of comparison with the other possible causes in order to
assess which one of them is the most likely. Therefore, if the other possible causes are
more than one, causation may be established with a degree of probability even less
than 50%.13 On the contrary, when it is impossible to establish with a certain degree of
probability, which one among the others is the cause of the damage, then none will be
responsible for the damage (the all or nothing rule). This is also the case when it is
impossible to prove which one among several producers put on the market the vaccine
specifically assumed by the victim. In fact, in Italy the apportionment of liability
according to the percentage of probability (so-called proportional liability) is not
allowed, nor is the market share approach.14
It is usually argued that the ascertainment of causation has to be undertaken
in accordance with a general scientific rule explaining the phenomenon in statistical
terms. However, the judge is allowed to decide the specific case according to a logical
inference that deviates from the scientific rule, or that takes the place of a scientific
rule.15 In fact, there might be circumstances in the specific case other than the
scientific rule, which are able to justify (legally) the decision of the court, taking also
into consideration the aim of the applicable law to that case, i.e. the policy choices
underlying the legal system.16 In other words, legal concepts (such as causation) are
punished unless it is certainly proven that he is the wrongdoer), while in a civil court the attention
is focused on the need of the victim claiming for a compensation.
13 E.g. in a case where it wasn’t possible to determine for sure which one of four possible events was
the one which put the house on fire, the Corte di Cassazione held liable the producer of the
defective gas bottle because this cause of damage ‘is in the first place according to a descending
order of four chances’ (Cass. civ., 26 July 2012, n. 13214). The causality is sometimes presumed by
the fact that there is no other possible cause of the damage (see e.g.: Cass. civ., 29 October 1980,
n. 5795, Resp. civ. e prev. 1981, p 302).
14 This doctrine on apportionment has been affirmed just in one case on medical malpractice decided
by the Corte di Cassazione: being impossible to ascertain if the death of the patient was caused by
the proven negligent action of the doctor or by the pre-existing fragile condition of the patient, the
Court condemned the doctor to compensate just a percentage of the damage according to the
percentage of probability that his action was actually the cause of the death (Cass. civ., 16 January
2009, n. 975, Giust. Civ. (Giustizia civile) 2010, I, p 2927). This decision has been radically and
explicitly rejected in subsequent decisions for the reason that the proof of causation, already
uncertain, would have become totally dependent on speculations about probabilities and eventua-
lities (Cass. Civ., 21 July 2011, n. 15991, Diritto di famiglia e delle persone 2012, p 576).
Analogously, in the UK the doctrine on proportionate liability affirmed by the House of Lord in
Barker v Corus [2006] UKHL 20 was immediately after rejected by the Compensation Act 2006.
15 See e.g.: Cass. Pen S.U., 10 July 2002, n. 30328. See M. BONA, ‘Causalità materiale, causalità
scientifica e causalità giuridica a confronto: quale ruolo ai consulenti tecnici nell’accertamento del
nesso di causa?’ in M. Bona et al. (eds), Il nesso di causa nel danno alla persona, (Milano: IPSOA
2005) p 147 ff.
16 This doctrine is exposed in P. TRIMARCHI, Causalità e danno. Following this doctrine, in order to
ascertain the legal causation, the court should take into consideration what is intended to be
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tools in the hands of the judge that the judge can soften or strengthen according to
the aims he wants to achieve and to the policy factors underpinning the system.
2.3. Case Law on the Public Compensation Fund
6 Given that unequivocal scientific evidence on vaccine cases does not exist, the
ascertainment of causation in this sphere is by its very nature controversial and has
thus given rise to contradictory judgments.
In particular, there are some courts of first instance in Italy, which consider
that circumstantial evidence is enough to infer causation.17 On the contrary, the
few cases brought in front of the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court have
ruled against the claimant for the reason that circumstantial evidence represented
merely a possibility, rather than a serious probability of a causal link between the
vaccination and the disease.18
Among the decisions given in favour of the claimant, there is the case brought
before the Tribunal of Milan by the parents of a child who received (when he was a few
months born) the injection of three doses of the compulsory vaccine Infanrix Hexa SK.
Four years after the injections, following the appearance of different symptoms, the
child was diagnosed with autism. Because their application for the indemnity provided
by the public compensation fund was rejected, they filed a lawsuit against the Ministry
of Health before the Tribunal of Milan.19 As the resolution of the issue of causation
requires specific knowledge of medical science, an expert was appointed by the court,
as provided by Italian law in such circumstances.20 The parties however did not
appoint their own experts, even though this opportunity is provided for under
Italian civil procedure. This case is of particular interest because the proof of the
causation was inferred by the expert, among other circumstances, also from the
internal data of the clinical trials carried out by the producer, i.e. the data that must
be mandatorily published since January 2015, under Regulation (EU) No. 536/2014
protected and to what extent by the legal provision that has been infringed by the wrongdoer. If the
damage alleged by the claimant is not included into the protection sphere insured by the infringed
legal provision, than there is no causation between the wrongful act and the damage.
17 E.g.: Trib. Rimini, 15 March 2012; Trib. Milano, 14 December 2012; Trib. Pesaro, 11 November
2013; Trib. Milano, 24 September 2014.
18 E.g.: Cass. civ., 16 June 2016, n. 12427; Cass. civ., 18 March 2014, n. 6266; App. Bologna, 13
February 2015 n. 1767.
19 Since the case concerns the legal right of an individual, the civil court is competent, while the
administrative court is competent just in case of individual legitimate interests jeopardized by the
public administration (with the exception of specific competences related to legal rights).
20 The relevance of the expert opinion in the judgment was emphasized in a comment on an
analogous case concerning vaccine and autism, where the judge, on the contrary, did not consider
proven the causal link among the two (S. D’ERRICO, ‘Autismo e vaccinazioni: la buona scienza nelle
giuste mani. un primo passo verso la “certificazione” dell’expert witness?’, Resp. civ. e prev., fasc.
5, 2015, p 1747).
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on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use.21 In fact, the court-appointed
expert considered that it was more probable that the autism had been caused by the
vaccine than by any other plausible cause, due to three specific circumstances. First,
according to the internal document of the vaccine producer, batches of this vaccine
seemed to have contained mercury, which has a toxic effect particularly on young
children. Secondly, the internal document revealed that two cases of autism had been
reported out of more than 6 million persons exposed to the vaccine within a period of
24 months. Lastly, the Tribunal noted that there was a temporal correlation between
the vaccination undertaken on the child in 2006 and the diagnosis of autism in 2010,
following the appearance of different symptoms. The expert rejected the genetic cause
of the autism alleged by the defendant because of the lack of ‘a specific constant
alteration of chromosomal material transmissible to the others’. Therefore, the expert
affirmed that it was more likely than not that the autism had been caused by the
vaccine than by other causes alleged by the defendant, and despite the fact that the
likelihood of the causal relationship with the vaccine had not been proven to a high
degree of certainty.
In Italy, the courts usually follow their expert’s opinion, and this case was no
exception. So the Tribunal decided the case in favour of the claimant pointing out
that the two cases of autism reported in the trial prove that there is a serious
probability (rather than a mere possibility) that the vaccination was the cause of
the autism.
2.4. Case Law on Tort Law for Dangerous Activities
7 Having been awarded redress by the public compensation fund, since the
amount of the indemnity covers just a part of the damage, the victim may claim
for the residual compensation from the producer. One claim does not preclude the
other. Nevertheless just one case against a vaccine’s manufacturer has been
reported.22 The claim was brought under Article 2050 c.c. which states that the
person who carries on a dangerous activity is responsible for the damages caused by
this activity, unless he is able to prove that he used all the suitable measures to
avoid the damage.23 Although the notion of dangerous activity has been interpreted
21 See Arts 80, 81 of EU Reg. 536/2014, OJ 2014 L 158/1. The Regulation’s purpose is the growth
acceleration of pharmaceutical research via clinical trials in the European Union. This process will
be assisted through a new Clinical Trial Data Portal Gateway, with the cooperation of the European
Medicines Agency and the European Commission. The new policy, entered into force on 1 January
2015, applies to clinical reports contained in all applications for centralized marketing authoriza-
tions submitted after that date. The sponsor of the authorized clinical trial must report to the
database all information on ‘serious and unexpected adverse reactions’.
22 Cass. civ., 13 February 2015, n. 2875.
23 This legal provision appeared for the first time in the 1942 Italian Codice civile and it deals with
the problems generated by the new industrial society. The legal provision regulates those activities
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narrowly, the legal provision has been applied in regard of pharmaceutical
manufacturers;24 and it is still applied, disregarding the implementation of the
European directive on product liability.25 In general, Italian tort law provisions are
preferred to product liability discipline for several reasons.26 Among others, they
have a longer time limit (five years instead of three), they do not have a foreclosure
period, there is no limitation on the recoverable damages and more importantly,
they do not require the claimant to prove the defectiveness of the product (see
below). He has the burden to prove just the causal link and, in this case, the causal
link was already ascertained in the decision against the public fund. However, the
producer may still escape from liability by proving that he did his best to avoid the
damage. This is exactly what happened in the reported case. The judge considered
that the vaccine producer could not have done more to avoid the damage since the
vaccine had been authorized by the Regulator, knowing that there was a certain
percentage of risk of side effects that has been considered unavoidable.
The next point examines what could possibly have happened if the same case
was brought before the court under the product liability law.
2.5. Product Liability in Vaccine Cases
8 Unlike in other countries, no product liability claims against vaccine manufac-
turers have been reported thus far in Italy. Among the other reasons, under product
liability law the victim has the burden to prove the defectiveness of the product,
and the ambiguous definition of defectiveness given by the European Directive
makes the result of such lawsuits highly uncertain.27
The assessment of defectiveness is indeed the key issue for the attribution of
the responsibility among the parties. In theory the judge, in order to implement the
deterrence function, should place liability upon the party who was in the best
position to avoid it at the lowest cost, considering their respective position and
their respective information at the moment when the damage occurred.28 The
problem arises when, like in vaccines cases, the damage is unavoidable by both
which, although they imply a great risk of injury, cannot be prohibited since they are beneficial to
community.
24 E.g.: Cass. civ., 20 July 1993, n. 8069, Giust. Civ. 1994, I, p 1037.
25 Tribunale di Roma, 20 April 2002, Resp. civ. e prev. 2002, p 1112.
26 E. RAJNERI, ‘Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and the Former
Liability Regime in Italy’, in D. Fairgrieve (ed.), Product Liability in Comparative Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005) p 67.
27 E. RAJNERI, ‘La notion de défectuosité du produit dans les jurisprudences des pays Européens’,
RIDC (Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé) 2015, p 186 ff.
28 There are several cases where the judge have affirmed that the damage could have been easier
avoided by a more careful user rather than by the manufacturer. As example see: Cass. civ., 15
March. 2007, n. 6007/2007 in Italy; OLG Düsseldorf, 20 December 2002, 14 U 99/02, VersR
(Versicherungsrecht) 2003, p 912, in Germany, and recently Wilkes v De Puy [2016] EWHC 3096.
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parties (except the choice not to use the product), though statistically foreseeable
in percentage.29 When the unavoidable damage is caused by a manufacturing
defect, a strict liability rule is generally applied against the manufacturer, even
though he has taken all possible precautions.30 It is assumed that the manufac-
turer, having statistically calculated the risk of damage caused by the manufactur-
ing defects, has consciously accepted this risk because the expected profit of his
activity outweighs its costs, including the costs of damages to third parties.31 After
all, he can easily manage this measurable cost, either with an insurance or with a
proportional increase of the product price. Furthermore, the strict liability rule
may incentivize the manufacturer to finance research in order to find a way to
eliminate the side effects of his product, rather than waiting for someone else’s
research on solving the problem.32 In other terms, the strict liability rule for
manufacturing defects represents an application of the ‘enterprise liability’ doc-
trine that was in circulation in Europe in the 1960s, though never made explicit by
lawmakers.33
9 The question is what happens when the damage has been allegedly caused by a
design defect, rather than by a manufacturing defect. Manufacturing defects are
29 If the risk of the specific unavoidable damage was unforeseeable, then the manufacturer will be
exempt from all responsibility applying the development risk defence, that has been put into force
almost everywhere in Europe.
30 The strict liability rule for manufacturing defects has been made explicit by the Italian and the
Spanish legislator (Art. 117 para. 3 of the Italian consumer code states: ‘a product is defective if it
does not offer the same safety offered by the other products of same series’), while in other Member
States it has been implemented by judges (see e.g. BGH, 9 May 1995, NJW (Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift) 1995, p 2162).
31 The strict liability rule on manufacturing defect cases was at first advocated by W.L. PROSSER, ‘The
Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)’, 69 Yale Law Journal 7 (1960),
p 1099. In Italy: U. CARNEVALI, La responsabilità del produttore (Milano: Giuffrè 1974).
32 The reasoning is exposed in W.M. LANDES & R. POSNER, ‘A Positive Economic Analysis of Product
Liability’, J. Legal Stud (Journal of Legal Studies) XIV (1985), p 555.
33 In Italy, the doctrine has been exposed in a perspective of social solidarity in S. RODOTÀ, Il problema
della responsabilità civile (Milano: Giuffrè 1964); in an economic perspective in P. TRIMARCHI, Rischio
e responsabilità oggettiva (Milano: Giuffrè 1961). The doctrine emerged first in France, at the end of
the 19th century, following the industrial revolution, as a way to award compensation for workers
injuries (P. JOSSERAND, La responsabilité du fait des choses inanimées (Paris: Rousseau 1897). In the
US as well the first studies on the enterprise liability doctrine start from the workers compensation
statutes at the beginning of 20th century (cfr. F.H. BOHLEN, ‘The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in
the Law of Tort’, 53. Am. L. Reg. (American Law Register) 209 (1905), p (273) at 337. The doctrine
then evolved with the works of Fleming James on strict liability as an instrument of distribution of
risks, followed by a very well-known article of Prosser which is considered the complete formulation
of the doctrine (W.L. PROSSER, 69 Yale Law Journal (1960), p 1099). These first studies were further
developed under the economic analysis perspective. For an historical study on the enterprise liability
doctrine: G.L. PRIEST, ‘The Invention of Enterprise Liability: a Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law’, J. Legal Stud XIV (1985), p 461.
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easily detectable because the product which caused the damage does not perform as
the others of the same series. On the contrary, when the design of an entire series
of product is questioned, the detection of a product’s defectiveness becomes much
more complex since a completely safe product cannot exist. Following the
American third Restatement on torts, in order to prove a design defect, the
claimant has to demonstrate that an alternative design of the product would have
avoided the damage and would have been cheaper than the overall costs of damages
foreseeable at the time when the product has been put into circulation.34 When an
alternative design does not exist, then the risk/utility test becomes an assessment
of the benefit of a type of product for the community. Therefore, a civil law court
duplicates the function of the regulatory authority, taking into account the general
interest within a trial among individual interests.35 Briefly, because the product is
beneficial to the entire community, the manufacturer is immune from liability in
the individual case where the product is the cause of a side effect.36 This output is
justified by arguing that the user has consciously accepted that risk, at the condi-
tion that the producer has adequately warned the user about it (this explains why
these cases are usually brought in front of the court claiming a warning defect
rather than a design defect). This reasoning, based on the principle of free will of
the victim, might be acceptable as regards hedonistic products, such as cigarettes
or alcoholic drinks. In contrast, when it is the case of a vaccine or a drug that is
necessary to treat or to prevent a disease, it is more difficult to argue that the user
has the free choice not to use the product if he prefers to avoid its inherent risk of
damage. Furthermore, this argument does not work for compulsory vaccines.
My point is that the cases on design defects present the very same factors
that justify the application of a strict liability rule in manufacturing defect
34 The risk/utility test reintroduces the concept of fault in the design defects cases, since it gives
relevance to the foreseeability and the avoidability of the damage in order to attribute the
responsibility to the manufacturer. The risk utility test is mentioned in the 3rd Restatement of
torts: Product Liability. A.D. TWERSKI, ‘From Risk-utility to Consumer Expectation: Enhancing the
Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation’, 11 Hofstra Law Review (1983), p 861.
For a critical analysis of the test: D.G. OWEN, ‘Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases’, 30 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform (University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (1996–1997), p 239 ff.; J.
STAPLETON, ‘Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective’, 39
Washburn Law Journal (2000), p 379 ff.
35 W.K. VISCUSI, Reforming Products Liability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1991), p 2.
36 Paradoxically, the vaccine would be considered defective when the magnitude of the side effect
happens to overcome the benefit, contrary to what expected, making the manufacturer liable for
the unforeseeable costs (see e.g. the Trilergan case). Unless the judge exempts the producer from
liability because the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product was
put into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the magnitude of the known risk (in
this sense: C. Cass., 28 July 2015, n. 15851). Following this reasoning straightforward, what makes
the product defective is the magnitude of the risk for the entire community and not just the simple
existence of the risk in the specific case.
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cases.37 These factors are, on the one hand, that the risk of damage caused by a
known side effect has been foreseen by the manufacturer who has consciously
accepted it, since it does not exceed the expected benefits of his activity
(otherwise the vaccine would not have been authorized). On the other hand,
although the user is aware of the risk of damage, he does not have any way to
avoid it except the decision not to use the product. It also has to be pointed out
that the European directive does not make any reference to the risk/utility test
or to a benefit/cost analysis as a way to detect the defectiveness of the product.
10 Nevertheless, the benefit/cost analysis has penetrated also into Europe and is
applied so far to cases of side effects caused by the authorized vaccine, making the
producer immune from the strict liability regime. This solution obviously underlies a
political choice justified by the fear to inhibit the vaccine production and innovation.
However, this fear does not take into account the fact that the peculiarities of the
vaccines market already guarantee a high level of protection to manufacturers. A
recent detailed study, conducted by the Italian antitrust authority, shows that the
vaccines market is a global oligopoly controlled to 80% by four major manufacturers.38
This market represents the most profitable activity within the pharmaceutical
production.39 Moreover, the high complexity of new generation vaccines, combined
with a long-lasting patent system,40 gives to the manufacturer the opportunity to fix
the price of his vaccines without the constraint of a competitive market.41
From this perspective, the aforementioned recent decision of the ECJ is
extremely relevant since it explicitly affirms that the vaccine is defective when it
causes abnormal and particularly serious damage to the patient, and therefore the
producer is liable not taking into any consideration the global benefit/cost analysis.
Though expressed in an obiter dictum of the decision, this statement will not be
37 E. RAJNERI, ‘The threat of collective redress in product liability cases’, in E. Lein, D. Fairgrieve &
M. Otero Crespo (eds), Collective Redress in Europe - Why and How? (London: BIICL 2015), p 317 ff.
38 http://www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/allegati-news/IC50_testo.pdf/download.html. The four
manufacturers are: GlaxoSmithKline, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Sanofi Pasteur and Pfizer.
39 ‘In 2014, the global vaccines market increased 6% to around $25 billion. The market is expected to
continue growing and represent around $38 billion by 2020’, see GSK Annual Report 2014,
February 2015, 8, https://www.gsk.com/media/603031/annual-report-2014.pdf. Considerably
higher estimates are reported, up to € 60 billion by 2019 (see Reuters, Global Vaccine Market
2014–2019: Technology Analysis – Live Attenuated, Toxoid, Conjugate, Subunit, Synthetic,
Dendritic Cell & Inactivated (18 February 2015), (http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSnGNX7V5hbv+1d0+GNW20150218).
40 G. PITRUZZELLA & G. MUSCOLO (eds), Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 2016); M. FRIEDE, Patent Landscaping for Vaccines: Patent
Information, Tools and Methodologies, WHO/WIPO/WTO Symposium, Geneva, February 2011
(http://www.who.int/phi/Martin_Friede.pdf).
41 G. PITRUZZELLA & L. ARNAUDO, ‘Vaccini, mercati farmaceutici e concorrenza, in una prospettiva
(anche) di diritti umani vaccines – Pharmaceutical Markets and Antitrust: A Human Rights
Perspective’, Rivista Italiana di Medicina Legale 2017, p 1.
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without consequences. However, at this stage, considering the ongoing uncertain-
ties of the legal scenario, it is still difficult to predict what would be the rule
applied by the Italian judge to a vaccine case under product liability law.
3. Vaccines in Germany – Social Security Law Solutions Substitute
Product Liability (Peter Rott)
3.1. Introduction
11 The issue of damages stemming from vaccines has not been dealt with in great
detail in German product liability case law. Two main problems arise for a claimant
who suffers damage that he or she believes to have been caused by vaccinations: the
proof of the defectiveness of the vaccine, and the causation between the vaccine
and the damage. In the area of pharmaceuticals, which includes vaccines, the
German legislator has created a special liability regime which is slightly more
consumer friendly than the system envisaged by the Product Liability Directive.
Its features shall be examined first (3.2.). That special regime is complemented by
regular tort law, which may be more beneficial to the claimant in particular cases
(3.3.), and by a social security law regime that applies to vaccinations that have
been recommended by public authorities (3.4.). Finally, the picture of German
legal reality would be incomplete if one did not take into account the potential
liability of the doctor who performs the vaccination (3.5.).
3.2. Product Liability Law Under the Pharmaceuticals Act
12 The Pharmaceuticals Act (Arzneimittelgesetz; AMG)42 is the encompassing
legal regime for pharmaceuticals, and vaccines are, of course, pharmaceuticals
within the meaning of the AMG.43 In §§ 84 ff. AMG, it contains special strict
liability rules that prevail over the general strict liability regime of the Product
Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz; ProdHaftG) of 1990, which implements the
Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC.44 Historically, that special regime was
introduced mainly as a reaction to the difficulties that victims of the Contergan
42 An English translation of the Act is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_amg/
index.html.
43 See § 4 para. 4 AMG.
44 See explicitly, § 15 ProdHaftG and the explanations of the German government, Bundestags-
Drucksache (Printed Matters of the German Bundestag; BT-Drs.) 11/5520, p 17. Some authors
argue that the inapplicability of the Product Liability Act is in breach of Art. 13 of the Product
Liability Directive. For an account of the debate, see G. WAGNER, in Münchener Kommentar zum
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (München: C.H. Beck, 7th edn 2017), § 15 ProdHaftG, margin n. 8. The
ProdHaftG definitely applies to pharmaceuticals outside the scope of application of the AMG. E.g.
the AMG does not apply to pharmaceuticals that the consumer has bought abroad and imported to
Germany by himself, see § 73 para. 3 AMG.
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(Thalidomide) scandal experienced when they tried to obtain compensation for the
damage caused by that drug.45 The previous regime of regular contract and tort law
proved to be insufficient to that effect, in particular due to the requirement of
negligence. The Act applies to medical products that are intended for human use
and that are subject to market authorization or that would, in principle, be subject
to market authorization but have been exempted by special ordinance.
Liability under §§ 84 ff. AMG complements claims stemming from contract or
tort law.46 Its main special features are (1) a special definition of the grounds for
liability, (2) a right of disclosure and (3) special rules on causation. Moreover, contrary
to general product liability law, the development risk defence does not apply.
3.2.1. Grounds of Liability
13 Under § 84 paragraph 1 AMG, the producer is liable if (1) when used in
accordance with its intended purpose, the medicinal product has harmful effects
which exceed the limits considered tolerable in the light of current medical knowl-
edge, or (2) the damage has occurred as a result of labelling, expert information or
instructions for use which do not comply with current medical knowledge. With
this definition, the provision expressly takes into account that many pharmaceu-
ticals have side effects. Thus, the producer is held liable for design defects,
manufacturing defects and warning defects.
Damage according to § 84 paragraph 1 AMG means the death or significant
personal injury or damage to health of the vaccinated person. Personal injury and
damage to health are insignificant if there is no need of treatment and if it does not
impact seriously on physical well-being.47 Since the reform of the law of damages of
2001, the victim can also claim damages for pain and suffering, which had pre-
viously been excluded under the strict liability regime of the AMG.
14 The risk/benefit balance follows the same rules as under the provision of § 25
paragraph 2 no. 5 AMG relating to grounds for the denial of admission of a
pharmaceutical product.48 Thus, once a pharmaceutical has been admitted, due
to its benefits that outweigh the risk, it cannot normally have a design defect. The
risk/benefit balance is defined in § 4 no. 28 AMG in line with Article 1 no. 28a of
Directive 2001/83/EC as an evaluation of the positive therapeutic effects of the
medicinal product in relation to the risks as defined in point 28, first indent. Those
45 See G. WAGNER, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, § 15 ProdHaftG, margin
n. 1 with further references.
46 See § 91 AMG.
47 A. KLOESEL & W. CYRAN, Arzneimittelrecht (München: C.H. Beck, 130th del. 2016), § 84 AMG,
margin n. 20.
48 See also OLG Hamm, 18 June 2003, NJW-RR (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift –
Rechtsprechungsreport) 2003, p 1382.
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risks are defined in § 4 no. 27 AMG in line with Article 1 no. 28 of Directive 2001/
83/EC as any risk relating to the quality, safety or efficacy of the medicinal product
as regards patients’ health or public health. Thus, the balance requires three steps:
the assessment of the positive therapeutic effects, the assessment of the risks, and
the balancing between them.49
Of primary importance for the benefit assessment is the therapeutic useful-
ness of the pharmaceutical product:50 The more serious the indication is, and the
less available alternative treatment is, the more severe side effects must the con-
sumer tolerate.51 The risks to be considered include the side effects but also the
risk of insufficient quality and effectiveness of the pharmaceutical product. On
balance, even serious side effects usually do not trigger the liability of the pharma-
ceutical company.
In an administrative procedure concerning the admission of a pharmaceu-
tical product, the burden of proof for an unfavourable risk/benefit balance is on the
authority. It suffices, however, if the authority can show scientific findings from
which one can derive serious concerns that the pharmaceutical may be intolerably
risky.52
In that respect, academic authors have discussed controversially whether
tolerability is to be assessed under consideration of the state of the science at the
time when the pharmaceutical was put into circulation,53 or at the time when the
claim is brought.54 The latter opinion seems preferable with the view to the fact
that § 84 AMG establishes a strict liability regime. As to warning defects in the
terms of § 84 paragraph 1 sentence 2 no. 2 AMG, the relevant question is whether
the labelling and the instructions of use reflect the state of science and art.
15 The damage must arise despite the correct use of the pharmaceutical
product, which is determined by the package insert that must be comprehen-
sible not only for experts but also for laymen. The victim must provide full
evidence for the fulfilment of the requirements of § 84 paragraph 1 AMG. Thus,
he or she does not only have to prove harmful effects but also that those
harmful effects and their frequency are intolerable when compared to the
benefits of the pharmaceutical.
49 See D. HART, ‘Die Nutzen/Risikoabwägung im Arzneimittelrecht’, Bundesgesundheitsblatt 2005, p 204.
50 M. HIELSCHER, ‘Zulassung von Phytopharmaka – Wirksamkeitsnachweis – Risiko-Nutzen-
Abschätzung’, PharmR (Pharma Recht) 1984, p 4.
51 W.A. REHMANN, Arzneimittelgesetz (München: C.H. Beck, 4th edn 2014), § 4, margin n. 30, with
reference to OVG Berlin, 26 July 1983, 7 S 312.83.
52 See OVG Northrhine-Westphalia, 17 September 2009, 31 A 1428/08, PharmR 2010, p 85.
53 A. SANDER, Arzneimittelgesetz (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1st edn 2015), § 84, margin n. 14; P. VON
CZETTRITZ and T. STRELOW, ‘Die Haftung für Impfschäden und die Verwirrung um die
Schweinegrippe’, PharmR 2010, p 163.
54 E. DEUTSCH, Medizinrecht (Berlin et al.: Springer, 7th edn 2014), margin n. 423.
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3.2.2. Right of Disclosure
16 For the claimant who has no insights in the development and the manufactur-
ing of the pharmaceutical product, it is very difficult to prove the existence of a
design defect or a manufacturing defect in the terms of § 84 paragraph 1 AMG.55
Therefore, in order to improve the claimant’s procedural position56 and to re-
establish equal terms between the parties,57 a special right of disclosure was
introduced in 2002. According to § 84a AMG, the victim can request information
related to effects, side effects and interaction of medical products that are known to
the producer and to suspected effects, side effects and interaction of medical
products that were brought to the producer’s attention and all further knowledge
which could be of significance in assessing the justifiability of harmful effects,
provided that facts exist that justify the assumption that a medical product has
caused the damage in question. Courts have placed the full burden of proof on the
claimant relating to those facts,58 whereas the causation between the medical
product and the damage must only be plausible.59 § 84a paragraph 2 AMG grants
the same disclosure right as regards authorities that are responsible for the
approval or supervision of the medical product. Exceptions apply on the grounds
of secrecy laws and overriding secrecy interests of the producer and third parties.
The disclosure right is in compliance with Article 13 of the Product Liability
Directive 85/374/EEC. Most authors had argued that § 84a AMG did not change
the substantive liability rules in pharmaceutical liability cases but merely facilitates
the procedural enforcement of the claim.60 On reference by the
Bundesgerichtshof,61 the Court of Justice confirmed that view.62
3.2.3. Causation
17 Under the original version of § 84 paragraph 1 AMG, the victim had to provide full
evidence of the causal link between the defectiveness of the pharmaceutical and the
damage.63 This heavy burdenwas alleviatedwith an amendment of 2001. Under the then
55 For anexample, seeLGTraunstein, 29September1994,1O1742/93,MedR(Medizinrecht)1995,p242.
56 BGH, 12 May 2015, VI ZR 328/11, NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) 2015, p 2502. On the
procedural relationship between the disclosure claim and the claim for damages, see BGH, 29
March 2011, VI ZR 117/10, NJW 2011, p 1815.
57 A. SPICKHOFF, Medizinrecht (München: C.H. Beck, 2nd edn 2014), § 84a AMG, margin n. 1.
58 See LG Berlin, 18 October 2006, 22 O 75/06, NJW 2007, p 3584 - Vioxx.
59 For detailed analysis, see BGH, 12 May 2015, VI ZR 328/11, NJW 2015, p 2502 – Levemir. See
also OLG Cologne, 26 January 2011, 5 U 81/10, NJW-RR 2011, p 1319.
60 See the references in BGH, 6 May 2013, VI ZR 328/11, PharmR 2013, p 459.
61 BGH, 6 May 2013, VI ZR 328/11, PharmR 2013, p 459.
62 ECJ, 20 November 2014, Case C-310/13 Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH v. S.
63 E. REINELT, ‘Zur Haftung des Arzneimittelherstellers für die Übertragung von Viren durch
Blutprodukte’, ZRP (Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik) 1994, p 333 ff.
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new § 84 paragraph 2 AMG, the damage will be presumed to have been caused by the
medicinal product administered if that medicinal product is capable of causing the
damage, in the circumstances pertaining to the individual case. The capability in the
individual case will be determined according to the composition and the dosage of the
administered medicinal product, the manner and duration of its administration when
used as intended, the temporal relationship to the occurrence of the damage, the
damage symptoms and the person’s state of health at the time of the administration as
well as all other circumstances which, in the individual case, speak for or against the
causation of damage.
In contrast, the presumption of causation does not apply if, in the light of
the circumstances pertaining to the individual case, another fact is capable of
causing the damage. However, the administration of additional medicinal products
which, in the circumstances pertaining to the individual case, are capable of
causing the damage shall not be considered as another fact unless, owing to the
administration of these medicinal products, claims for reasons other than the lack
of causality for the damage, do not exist under this provision.
Thus, the victim must (only) prove the damage, the application of the
concrete pharmaceutical and the possibility of the pharmaceutical causing the
damage,64 or, in the case of warning defects, that the damage was caused by the
vaccination and the consequence of missing or incorrect instruction.65 In this
regard, no full proof is necessary but the victim must only prove that the medicinal
product is capable of causing the damage. It is then for the producer to show that
the damaging effects of the medical product do not have their cause in the areas of
design and manufacturing.
3.2.4. Various Other Rules
18 Under § 88 AMG, liability caps apply. Liability is limited to € 600,000 for the death
of or injury to a person, or an annuity of € 36,000 per year. The total liability for the
deaths or injuries of several persons arising from the same medical product is limited to
€ 120million or annuities of € 7.2million per year. If the sum of the individual damages
exceeds that total liability, individual compensation is reduced pro rata.
Several producers that have caused the same damage are jointly and sever-
ally liable, and as in general product liability law, a slight modification to the
general rules on recourse of § 426 BGB applies in that apportionment with a
view to the particular circumstances of the individual case (rather than per capita)
is the rule, § 93 AMG.
64 W.A. REHMANN, Arzneimittelgesetz, § 84, margin n. 9.
65 G. WAGNER, ‘Das Zweite Schadensänderungsgesetz’, NJW 2002, p 2049.
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Under § 94 AMG, the producer has to provide financial coverage for poten-
tial damage; which can be arranged by way of insurance or a bank guarantee. That
type of compulsory insurance is missing in general product liability law.
§ 94a AMG has introduced special jurisdiction of the court where the victim
has his or her domicile at the time of the filing of the action (rather than the place
where the damage occurred).
3.2.5. Case Law
19 The defectiveness of vaccinations in terms of § 84 paragraph 1 AMG appears
to have only been discussed in very few cases. In 2007, a claimant failed to show, to
the satisfaction of the court, that a vaccination against tick-borne encephalitis
(TBE) was defective because she developed a Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.66 In the
case of a child who turned blind after vaccination against hepatitis B, the court held
that the risk/benefit balance clearly was in favour of the vaccine so that the vaccine
was not defective. Moreover, no warning defect was present as the package insert
mentioned the risk of damage to the visual nerve, and finally the court also rejected
causation between the vaccination and the blindness, arguing that blindness could
also have been caused by a bacterial or viral infection.67
Cases on Infanrix Hexa do not seem to have been brought under § 84 AMG.
3.3. General Tort Law
20 Claims can, in principle, also be brought under the general tort law provision of
§ 823 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; BGB). The advantages
compared to liability under § 84 AMG are the following: § 823 paragraph 1 BGB
does not only cover design defects, manufacturing defects and warning defects but
also imposes liability on a producer who does not observe his product after he has put
it into circulation and who fails to take precautions, in particular by way of recalls, if
the defectiveness of the product becomes apparent at a later stage.68 Tort liability
can also arise in case of a vaccine that fails to have the desired protective effect.69
A disadvantage as compared to the strict liability regime of § 84 paragraph 1
AMG is, in particular, that liability under § 823 paragraph 1 BGB is fault based.
Moreover, the special rules on the victim’s disclosure right and the slight facilita-
tion of the proof of causation do not apply to claims under general tort law. Quite
66 See LG München, 12 January 2007, 6 O 23277/04, ZMGR (Zeitschrift für das gesamte Medizin-
und Gesundheitsrecht) 2009, p 105.
67 See OLG Hamm, 18 June 2003, 3 U 99/02, NJW-RR 2003, p 1382.
68 See BGH, 24 January 1989, VI ZR 112/88, NJW 1989, p 1542; OLG Frankfurt, 11 November
1993, 1 U 254/88, NJW-RR 1995, p 406.
69 See BGH, 17 March 1981, VI ZR 191/79, NJW 1981, p 1603 (concerning a plant protection
product).
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obviously, the claim is even more difficult to establish than the claim under § 84
AMG.
3.4. Social Security Law
3.4.1. The Act on Protection Against Infections
21 Typically, vaccines are not defective in the terms of § 84 paragraph 1 AMG.70
In order to close that gap and to support persons who suffer damage from a
vaccination despite of the lack of defectiveness in terms of the AMG, § 60 of the
Act on Protection against Infections (Infektionsschutzgesetz; IfSG) of 2001 provides
for a special compensation regime under social security law. If the requirements are
met, the claimant can obtain, for example, medical treatment, sickness benefits,
rehabilitation measures, an economic rent or compensation for the inability to
exercise his or her profession further.71
The claim requires ‘vaccination damage’, which is defined by § 2 no. 11 IfSG
as the health-related and economic consequence of damage to health that exceeds
the normal reaction to a vaccination. The basic idea is that vaccination is not only
meant to protect the individual but also serves the public good of avoiding the
spread of diseases.72 Thus, the individual who obtains the vaccination also acts in
the public interest and shall not bear the risk of suffering damage from this.73
§ 60 IfSG, however, only applies if the vaccination had been ‘publicly
recommended’, that recommendation confirming the public interest in the vacci-
nation. This means, according to the case law of the Federal Social Court
(Bundessozialgericht; BSG), that the competent public authority must have recom-
mended the vaccination.74
The claimant must prove that the vaccination caused an unusual reaction,
and that that reaction caused adverse consequences. Whereas the vaccination as
such, the reaction and the adverse consequences must be fully proven, the claimant
must only demonstrate reasonable likelihood of causation between them.75
According to the BSG, the causal link is present if under consideration of the
70 See the explicit statement in BSG (Federal Social Court), 20 July 2005, B 9a – 9 VJ 2/04 R, BSGE
(Entscheidungen des Bundessozialgerichts) 95, 66, at para. 32.
71 S. KNICKREHM, Gesamtes Soziales Entschädigungsrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2012), § 60 IfSG,
margin n. 11.
72 H.G. RITZ, ‘Impfentschädigung’, in O. Deinert & F. Welti (eds), Stichwortkommentar
Behindertenrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2nd edn 2014), margin n. 1.
73 See BSG, 20 July 2005, B 9a – 9 VJ 2/04 R, BSGE 95, 66; P. VON CZETTRITZ & T. STRELOW, PharmR
2010, p (163), at 166.
74 For a case where a vaccine was used in clinical trials but had not yet been admitted to the market,
and therefore the claim under § 60 IfSG failed, see BSG, 20 July 2005, B 9a – 9 VJ 2/04 R, BSGE
95, 66.
75 § 61 IfSG.
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leading medical opinion it is more likely than not that the vaccination was the
cause of the permanent damage.76 Hereby, the court will consider the state of
scientific knowledge at the time of the court decision even if the vaccination had
been many years ago. Where the origins of a particular disease are unclear, that
causal link will not normally be established.77
3.4.2. Case Law
22 Cases under § 60 IfSG are much more frequent than cases under product
liability law. Examples of successful litigation include claims relating to a polio
vaccination, followed by encephalitis.78 In many cases, however, the claims failed
because the courts saw no sufficient evidence of the causation between the vaccina-
tion and the damage. This applies, in particular but not exclusively, to vaccinations
with Infanrix Hexa.
In 2015, the LSG Hamburg dealt with a case of autism. Here, the court
decided that with regard to 750,000 vaccinations in Germany and several million
vaccinations worldwide with the vaccine Infanrix Hexa, the few cases of brain
damage that are claimed to have been caused by Infanrix Hexa could not be
connected with that vaccine with sufficient probability. The mere theoretical pos-
sibility that the vaccination might have caused brain damage was not enough to
trigger a claim under § 60 IfSG.79 Thus, the claim failed. Appeal against that
decision was not allowed by the BSG.80
Courts have also denied sufficient likelihood of a causal link between vacci-
nations with Infanrix Hexa and diabetes mellutis type 1.81 A likely causal link
between an Infanrix Hexa vaccination and a seizure disorder was denied in a case
where such disorders had occurred in the wider family of the child.82 In contrast, a
child who developed a seizure disorder and had shown relevant symptoms on the
day of the vaccination was successful in court.83
Beyond Infanrix Hexa, courts have rejected the likelihood of a causal link
between an influenza vaccination and the development of a Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome84 as well as between a vaccination against mumps, measles and rubella
76 See e.g. BSG, 19 March 1986, 9a RVi 2/84, BSGE 60, 58.
77 See LSG Berlin-Brandenburg, 8 July 2016, L 13 VJ 16/12, BeckRS 2016, 73023.
78 See LSG Berlin-Brandenburg, 16 March 2016, L 13 VJ 59/14 WA, BeckRS 2016, 69718.
79 LSG Hamburg, 29 September 2015, L 3 VE 9 13, BeckRS 2016, 70836.
80 See BSG, 27 April 2016, B 9 V 73/15 B, BeckRS 2016, 69521.
81 See LSG Berlin-Brandenburg, 8 July 2016, L 13 VJ 16/12, BeckRS 2015, 112974.
82 See LSG Sachsen-Anhalt, 8 July 2015, L 13 VJ 16/12, BeckRS 2014, 68871.
83 See SG München, 3 December 2015, S 9 VJ 2/06, BeckRS 2016, 70604. See also LSG Bayern, 15
December 2015, L 15 VJ 4/12, BeckRS 2016, 67978 (on Hexavac).
84 LSG Nordrhein-Westfalen, 15 January 2016, L 13 VJ 27/13, BeckRS 2016, 68405.
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(MMR) and severe brain damage.85 Time seems to be of the essence: Where the
problem does not become apparent close to the vaccination, courts tend to reject
the likelihood of a causal link.86
3.5. Medical Liability
23 The previous analysis has demonstrated the difficulties in obtaining compen-
sation for vaccination under product liability law as well as under social security
law, and the limitations of compensation under social security law, which does not
provide damages for pain and suffering. It is before that background that victims of
vaccination damages have resorted to suing the doctor who administered the
vaccination, or the hospital, under tort law. That route is facilitated by the fact
that every vaccination, at least by way of injection, is per se a physical injury under
German law, which requires justification through the consent of the victim. That
consent must be given under full information on the risks of the vaccination as well
as of the omission of a vaccination.87 Thus, victims have argued that they had not
been fully informed of these risks and that therefore their consent had been invalid.
The extent of the duty to inform the patient has been concretized by the
permanent vaccination commission of the Robert Koch Institute (Ständige
Impfkommission beim Robert-Koch-Institut), which is an expert commission that
is entrusted to advise the German government in vaccination matters. According to
the vaccination recommendations of the StIKO, the doctor must inform the
patient, amongst others, on the disease to be prevented, treatment of that disease,
the usefulness of the vaccination for the individual patient and for public health,
the vaccine itself, the vaccination, the duration of the protection achieved, required
behaviour after the vaccination, contraindications, side effects and complications
regardless of their frequency and the necessity of booster injections.88 According to
the BGH, the doctor has to inform the patient in person, whereas it is normally
insufficient to merely hand out an information sheet to the patient.89 Quite
obviously, the medical profession has reacted by drafting comprehensive informa-
tion sheets and by making the patient sign that he or she was fully informed on all
the above-mentioned issues.
85 LSG Baden-Württemberg, 21 April 2015, L 6 VJ 1460/13, BeckRS 2015, 69463.
86 Ibid.
87 For details, see E. DEUTSCH, ‘Aufklärung und Einwilligung vor Impfungen’, VersR 1998, p 1053 ff.
88 J. BÜTIKOFER, ‘Schutzimpfungen: Aufklärungspflicht aus juristischer Sicht’, Ärzteblatt 1997; 94,
p A-1794–1796.
89 BGH, 15 February 2000, VI ZR 48/99, NJW 2000, p 1784.
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3.6. Conclusions
24 Under German law, the defectiveness of pharmaceuticals under product liability
law is assessedwith the same risk/benefits balance test that is also used for the admission
of pharmaceuticals. Thus, where a pharmaceutical has passed that test in the admission
procedure, it is quite unlikely that courts will consider it defective in the terms of product
liability law. The additional measures of a disclosure right and the facilitation of the
proof of causation have therefore not produced significant effects in practice.
There are two ways, by which vaccination victims can still obtain compensa-
tion for the damage they suffer. The route that was designed by the legislator under
the Act on Protection against Infections (IfSG), which belongs to the sphere of
social security law, is to compensate victims of side effects that are generally
tolerable (in the sense of the risk/benefits balance) but materialize in an unusual
manner in the individual case. The alternative route, under medical liability law, is
to sue the doctor who administered the vaccine, or the hospital, in the case of
insufficient information concerning the disease to be prevented, treatment of that
disease, the usefulness of the vaccination for the individual patient and for public
health, the vaccine itself, the vaccination, the duration of the protection achieved,
required behaviour after the vaccination, contraindications, side effects and com-
plications regardless of their frequency and the necessity of booster injections. The
advantage of that latter route is that the victim can obtain damages for pain and
suffering, which are not part of the claim under social security law.
Still, even under social security law, causation between a (publicly recom-
mended) vaccination and the damage must at least be more likely than not, and that
test may well fail in cases where a reaction to the vaccination was not immediate
and where the causes of diseases are not sufficiently researched. With regard to
Inferix Hexa, German courts were not convinced that autism could be caused by
that vaccine. Therefore, claims failed even under social security law.
4. The Vaccines issue in France (Jean-Sébastien Borghetti)
4.1. Introduction
25 Many cases concerning damage allegedly caused by vaccines have reached
French superior courts over the last decade. Vaccine-linked litigation is actually
quite diverse, with different types of vaccines being concerned, but the most
significant part of it has to do with vaccines against hepatitis B. This contribution
will therefore focus on hepatitis B vaccination litigation.
Hepatitis B is a viral pathology affecting the liver.90 Vaccination against is
has been available since 1982. It was made compulsory in France for health care
90 For detailed fact-sheet on the disease by the World Health Organization (WHO), see http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs204/en/index.html.
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professionals in 1991.91 Three years later, in July 1994, the French Ministry of
Health launched a mass immunization campaign against hepatitis B, targeting
especially teenagers. Vaccination was however not made compulsory. In the follow-
ing years, cases were reported in which persons had showed symptoms of demye-
linating diseases after they had received the vaccine. The idea spread that hepatitis
B vaccination could cause such diseases. This led the Minister of Health in 1998 to
call a suspension of the vaccination campaign, which has never resumed. In the
meantime, the debate on the opportunity and possible side effects of hepatitis B
vaccination has been going on, even though the World Health Organization
(WHO),92 the French Medical Academy,93 and the French High Council for
Public Health94 keep recommending this vaccination.
Demyelination is the loss of the myelin sheath, which insulates the nerves. It
is the source of neurodegenerative autoimmune diseases, including multiple sclero-
sis and Guillain–Barré syndrome. The aetiology of these demyelinating diseases is
still a matter of debate. It is believed that they result from some combination of
genetic, environmental, and infectious factors, but no definitive explanation has
been found so far.95 Several epidemiological studies investigating the relationship
between hepatitis B vaccination and the occurrence of a demyelinating disease have
been carried out.96 All of them, except one, which was later criticized for its
methodology,97 have failed to find a significant statistical association between the
two. To this day, there is therefore no scientific evidence that a vaccination against
hepatitis B can cause a demyelinating disease; but there is no definitive evidence to
the contrary either. The existence of a connection between hepatitis B vaccination
91 Art. 1 of loi no 91–73 of 18 January 1991, now Art L 3111-4 code de la santé public (public health
code).
92 See the WHO Recommendations for Routine Immunization (updated September 2016), http://
www.who.int/immunization/policy/Immunization_routine_table1.pdf?ua=1.
93 Communiqué de l’Académie nationale de médecine, 14 October 2008, http://www.academie-
medecine.fr/publication100035919/.
94 Avis relatif à la vaccination contre l’hépatite B, 2 October 2008, http://www.hcsp.fr/Explore.cgi/
avisrapportsdomaine?clefr=41.
95 See the factsheet (October 2014) of the French National Institute for Health and Medical Research
(INSERM), http://www.inserm.fr/thematiques/neurosciences-sciences-cognitives-neurologie-psy
chiatrie/dossiers-d-information/sclerose-en-plaques-sep.
96 For more details on these scientific studies, see J.-S. BORGHETTI, ‘Litigation on Hepatitis B
Vaccination and Demyelinating Diseases in France: Breaking Through Scientific Uncertainty?’,
in M. Martín-Casals & D.M. Papayannis (eds), Uncertain Causation in Tort Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2015) p (11) at 13 f.
97 WHO GLOBAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON VACCINE SAFETY, Response to the paper by M.A. Hernán and




and the development of demyelinating diseases is thus still an open issue for
epidemiologists and scientists.
It is in this context that French courts have been faced with
compensation claims brought by plaintiffs who have allegedly developed a
demyelinating disease due to their having been vaccinated against hepatitis B.
Judges have been surprisingly favourable to these claims. This is illustrated by
the way in which they have handled proof of causation (4.2.) and of defective-
ness (4.3.).
4.2. Causation
26 A majority of claims in relation with hepatitis B vaccination have been brought
on one of two legal bases.98 The first one is a special compensation scheme for
injuries caused by compulsory vaccinations.99 This scheme is now regulated by
Article L 3111–9 code de la santé publique (public health code).100 Compensation is
due as soon as the plaintiff proves that his damage is directly imputable to a
compulsory vaccination. No other condition, such as negligence or the vaccine’s
defectiveness, is required. Article L 3111–9 obviously applies to compulsory hepa-
titis B vaccination for health care professionals; but it does not apply to non-
compulsory vaccinations, even if they were recommended, encouraged, or subsi-
dized by the government. Claims based on this special compensation scheme must
be brought before a special compensation fund, ONIAM (Office national d’indem-
nisation des accidents médicaux, des affections iatrogènes et des infections nosoco-
miales). The fund decides whether the conditions set by the law are met, and, if so,
offers a certain amount of damages. If a plaintiff is not satisfied with the ONIAM’s
appraisal of the situation or its compensation proposal, he can appeal to an
administrative court.101
27 The second legal basis for claims in relation with hepatitis B vaccination is
of course the product liability regime derived from the Product Liability
98 On the other possible legal bases for such compensation claims in French law, see J.-S. BORGHETTI,
in Uncertain Causation in Tort Law, p 16.
99 Loi no 64-643 of 1 July 1964.
100 This text provides: ‘Sans préjudice des actions qui pourraient être exercées conformément au droit
commun, la réparation intégrale des préjudices directement imputables à une vaccination obliga-
toire pratiquée dans les conditions mentionnées au présent chapitre, est assurée par l’Office
national d’indemnisation des accidents médicaux, des affections iatrogènes et des infections
nosocomiales institué à l’article L. 1142-22, au titre de la solidarité nationale.’
101 In France, there exists a sharp divide between private and public law. Substantive law normally
varies according to whether the defendant is a private or a public person. Besides, civil courts,
which have jurisdiction in private law matters, are distinct from administrative courts, which deal
with questions pertaining to public law. ONIAM is a public person and any claim against it must
therefore be brought before an administrative court.
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Directive 85/374/EEC.102 As is well known, the Directive makes the producer
liable for damage caused by a defect in his product (Article 1), if the plaintiff
proves damage, the defect, and the causal relationship between defect and
damage (Article 4). The Directive regards a product as defective when it does
not provide the safety a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances
into account, including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which
it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; (c) the time
when the product was put into circulation (Article 6). Claims based on product
liability legislation and directed against hepatitis B vaccine producers,103 which
are commercial companies, are brought before civil courts (as opposed to
administrative courts).
28 Whatever the basis of his claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
vaccine he took caused his disease.104 But how is that possible, when there is no
scientific or epidemiological evidence that hepatitis B vaccination can actually
cause a demyelinating disease? French courts, both administrative and civil, have
helped plaintiffs to overcome this obstacle by accepting, or even requiring, the use
of presumptions.
As far as claims based on L 3111–9 code de la santé publique are
concerned, the Conseil d’État, the supreme French administrative court, set
a rule in four 2007 decisions, whereby causation between the vaccination and
the demyelinating disease must be regarded as established, if the first
symptoms of the disease appear within a short (‘bref’) delay after the
vaccination,105 and no other cause for the disease can be identified.106 The
102 Transposition of Directive 85/374/EEC was to take place before the end of July 1988, but France
waited until May 1998 before it complied with its obligations. The rules set by the directive are now
to be found at Arts 1245–1245-17 (formerly Arts 1386-1–1386-18) of the French Code civil. On the
rather hectic transposition process of the directive in France, see S. WHITTAKER, Liability for
Products: English Law, French Law, and European Harmonization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2005) p 450.
103 Two different pharmaceutical companies have marketed Hepatitis B vaccines in France. No
differences between these two vaccines have been alleged, as far as a possible side effects are
concerned.
104 Art L 3111-9 code de la santé publique requires that damage be ‘imputable’ to a compulsory
vaccination, but this is just another way of requiring a causal relationship between the two. As to
the Directive, it only mentions the causal relationship between the product’s defect and damage
(Art. 4), but it is quite obvious that this relationship cannot exist if damage was not a consequence
of the product’s use. The existence of a causal relationship between the vaccination and the disease
therefore appears as a fundamental requirement under both regimes.
105 Subsequent cases have shown that, for the Conseil d’État, the delay must be regarded as short if it
is not longer than three months.
106 Conseil d’État (CE), 9 March 2007, nos 267635, 278665, 283067 and 285288, AJDA (Actualité
Juridique Droit Administratif) 2007, p 861, concl. T. OLSON, D 2007, p 2204, note L. NEYRET, and p
2900, obs. P. BRUN, JCP G 2007, II, p 10142, note A. LAUDE.
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Conseil d’État therefore considers that, absent identified possible other causes
for the disease, a short delay between the vaccination and the appearance of
the disease creates a presumption that the former caused the latter.107 No
scientific reason was given for the adoption of this rule, however, which thus
appears as arbitrary.108
Civil courts faced with claims based on product liability rules have adopted a
slightly different approach on causation, but are also willing to allow the bypassing
of scientific uncertainty. France’s highest civil court, the Cour de cassation, actu-
ally started by adopting a rather strict view on the issue. In 2003, it ruled that lower
judges could not regard causation between vaccination and the plaintiff’s disease as
established, given the absence of scientific certainty on the possible link between
hepatitis B vaccination and multiple sclerosis.109 Five years later, however, partly
under the pressure of the academia,110 the Cour de cassation changed its position.
It quashed two decisions by appellate courts, which had rejected compensation
claims on the ground that the state of scientific uncertainty did not allow the
admission of a causal link between hepatitis B vaccination and the occurrence of
a demyelinating disease. The Cour de cassation, on that occasion, held that the
lower courts had violated the law, because they had followed ‘a probabilistic
approach based exclusively on the lack of scientific and statistical link between
107 For other applications of this rule, see CE, 25 July 2007, no 288052; 4 July 2008, no 299832; 11
July 2008, no 289763; 18 February 2009, no 305810; 10 April 2009, no 296630; 24 July 2009,
nos 308876 and 304325, JCP G 2009, p 223, obs M.-C. Rouault, RDC (Revue des Contrats) 2010,
p 79, obs J.-S. BORGHETTI; 9 February 2011, no 319497; 25 February 2011, no 324051; 4 March
2011, no 313369; 28 July 2011, no 318466; 13 February 2012, no 331348; 17 February 2012, no
331277, AJDA 2012, p 1244, note C. LANTERO; 8 November 2012, no 350886; 6 November 2013,
no 345696; 13 December 2013, no 352460; 30 April 2014, no 357696; 5 November 2014, no
363036; 27 May 2015, no 369142.
108 Decisions by French supreme courts are usually very terse and stick to a formal mode of reasoning.
They do not give the substantive reasons underlying the choices made by judges; but these reasons
can sometimes be found in the reports of the magistrates who have prepared the decisions, even if
these reports are only occasionally made public and have no authority per se. However, the
preliminary report to the 2007 decisions which established the short-delay rule does not give any
justification for it (even though it explains the state of scientific uncertainty on the issue of the
relationship between vaccination against hepatitis B and the occurrence of demyelinating diseases):
see T. OLSON, conclusions on CE, 9 March 2007, AJDA 2007, p 861.
109 Cass civ 1re, 23 September 2003, nos 01-13063 and 01-13064, D 2003, p 2579, note L. NEYRET,
D 2004, p 898, note Y.M. SERINET & R. MISLAWSKI, 1344, obs. D. MAZEAUD, JCP G 2003, II,
p 10179, note N. JONQUET et al, 2004, I, 101, no 23, obs. G. VINEY, Resp civ assur 2003, chron
28, note C. RADÉ, RTD civ 2004, p 101, obs. P. JOURDAIN.
110 Tort scholars in France are traditionally quite plaintiff-oriented, and so are the courts. Many
scholars criticized the position adopted by the Cour de cassation in 2003 as too harsh for plaintiffs
(and also pointed to the discrepancy between the Cour de cassation’s position and that of the
Conseil d’État after the latter’s 2007 decisions); see e.g. C. RADÉ, note on Cour d’appel (CA) Paris,
2 June 2006, Resp civ assur 2006, comm 306.
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vaccination and the development of the disease’,111 whereas they should have
considered whether the facts of the case did not allow for a presumption that the
vaccine had caused the plaintiff’s disease.112
29 These decisions must be well understood. They have not affirmed the exis-
tence of a causal relationship between the vaccination and the disease in the cases
under scrutiny; but they have repudiated the former approach, which regarded the
state of scientific uncertainty as a bar to product liability claims involving vaccines
against hepatitis B. These 2008 decisions have not followed the Conseil d’État’s
solution, either. According to the latter, causation must be presumed if the disease
appeared in the three months that follow the vaccination, and no other cause for
the disease is identified. The Cour de cassation did not set such a rule, but only
requires lower courts to decide, on the facts of the case, whether a presumption of
causation may be retained.
The position adopted by the Cour de cassation in effect grants lower courts
full freedom in assessing the existence of causation between a vaccination and a
demyelinating disease. Acknowledging such causation has become a matter of
presumption ‘on the facts’, on which the Cour de cassation exerts no control.
This inevitably leads to diverging approaches by lower courts, as subsequent
cases have shown.113 Very similar circumstances can lead to diverging rulings on
the issue of causation, depending on the lower judges’ conception of the aetiology
of demyelinating diseases.114 Some courts are quite willing to regard causation as
111 ‘Une approche probabiliste déduite exclusivement de l’absence de lien scientifique et statistique
entre vaccination et développement de la maladie’.
112 Cass civ 1re, 22 May 2008, Bull civ (Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation, Chambres civiles) I,
nos 148 and 149, D 2008, p 2894, obs. P. JOURDAIN, JCP G 2008, II, p 10131, note L. GRYNBAUM, I,
186, no 3, obs. P. STOFFEL-MUNCK, Resp civ assur 2008, Étude 8, note C. RADÉ, RTD civ 2008, p
492, obs. P. JOURDAIN, RDC 2008, p 1186, obs. J.-S. BORGHETTI.
113 For cases in which lower judges considered causation as established on the facts of the case, see
Cass civ 1re, 9 July 2009, no 08-11073, Bull civ I, no 176, D 2010, p 49, obs. P. BRUN, JCP G 2009,
p 308, note P. SARGOS, RTD civ 2009, p 735, obs. P. JOURDAIN, RDC 2010, p 79, obs. J.-S. BORGHETTI;
26 September 2012, no 11-17738, D 2012, p 2853, note J.-S. BORGHETTI and obs. C. RADÉ, 2013, p
40, obs. P. BRUN; 10 July 2013, no 12-21314, D 2013, p 2306 avis C. MELLOTTÉE, p 2312, note P.
BRUN, p 2315, note J.-S. BORGHETTI. For cases where lower judges have refused to acknowledge
causation, see Cass civ 1re, 24 September 2009, no 08-16097; 25 November 2010, no 09-16556,
Bull civ I, no 245, JCP G 2011, p 79, note J.-S. BORGHETTI, Resp civ assur 2011, comm. 24, note C.
RADÉ, RTD civ 2011, p 134, obs. P. JOURDAIN; 25 November 2010, no 09-71013; 28 April 2011, no
10-15289; 26 January 2012, no 10-28195; 28 June 2012, no 11-14287; 29 May 2013, no 12-
20.903, D 2013, p 1717, note J.-S. BORGHETTI, p 1723, note P. BRUN.
114 The best example is a case in which an appellate court had regarded causation as established on the
facts of the case (CA Versailles, 10 February 2011, no 09/07555); this decision was later quashed
on the issue of defectiveness (Cass civ 1re, 26 September 2012, no 11-17738) and submitted to the
Paris appellate court to be decided anew. The Paris court then ruled that the facts put forward by
the plaintiff were not sufficient to establish causation (CA Paris, 7 March 2014, no 13/01546).
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established, if (1) the demyelinating disease appeared shortly after the vaccination,
and (2) no other cause than the vaccination can be found to explain the outbreak of
the disease. These elements are the same as those which are used by the Conseil
d’État to presume causation, but the difference is that lower civil courts are free to
regard them as convincing or not, and to decide what is the maximum length of the
delay within which the appearance of the symptoms can be regarded as conclusive
of causation. Other lower civil courts, on the other hand, are much stricter in their
assessment of causation and tend to regard the same elements as inconclusive,
given the state of scientific uncertainty as to the links between hepatitis B vaccina-
tion and demyelinating diseases.
30 This divergence among lower courts is of course hardly satisfying. Apart from
giving the impression that scientific truth varies from one local jurisdiction to the
other, it creates obvious inequalities among plaintiffs, depending on the court
before which they bring their case, and encourages forum shopping. Some authors
are therefore of the opinion that the Cour de cassation should follow the Conseil
d’État’s path and regard causation as established, if certain conditions are met.
Others, including the author of this contribution, believe that there is in the first
place a problem with the elements, which are used by the courts to presume
causation.115
The first element, i.e. the absence of another cause than the vaccination to
explain the outbreak of the disease, is not really convincing. It is true that,
generally speaking, eliminating alternative causes can establish the causal connec-
tion between two events. For such reasoning to be valid, however, it is necessary
that all possible causes of the event whose origin is under investigation be identi-
fied. The problem with multiple sclerosis, as has been said before, is that its
aetiology is not yet fully known. In this context, how is it possible for judges to
assert that, in any given case, there could be no other cause than the vaccination to
account for the outbreak of the disease? In particular, the fact that there was no
history of the disease in the plaintiff’s family, a factor often put forward by the
Conseil d’État, can be regarded as convincing only if it is assumed that multiple
sclerosis normally develops out of internal or genetic factors; but the courts give no
justification for this assumption.
The second and main element put forward by the courts to establish causa-
tion is the proximity in time between the vaccination and the onset of the first
symptoms of the disease. It seems as though, for many judges, as well as for many in
the academia, this proximity is the ultimate proof of causation. The importance of
this element is especially clear in the decisions of the Conseil d’État. Undoubtedly,
115 For a presentation of the debate and the various positions advocated by French authors, see
F. LEDUC, S. CARVAL. J.-S. BORGHETTI, G. MOR & J. VOGEL, ‘Discussion sur la causalité en matière
de responsabilité du fait des produits de santé’, Resp civ assur 2016, dossier 11–15.
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such a time coincidence between the vaccination and the appearance of the first
symptoms of a demyelinating disease is disturbing, and it is not surprising if some
plaintiffs are convinced that this is more than a coincidence. One can regard such a
coincidence as a proof of causation, however, only if one implicitly assumes that
vaccination can cause a demyelinating disease and that the disease will then occur
in a very short time after the vaccination. Without such an underlying theory, the
mere coincidence of two facts does not bear any significance. Viewing time coin-
cidence as a proof of causation therefore amounts to holding true the theory that
should have been demonstrated in the first place, but which is not supported by
existing epidemiological studies.116
31 Yet, in its recent Sanofi Pasteur decision,117 the ECJ has expressly validated
both the Cour de cassation’s approach to proving causation and the elements that
are taken into account by lower courts to establish causation. Asked whether
causation could be established on the facts of the case, notwithstanding the finding
that medical research neither establishes nor rules out the existence of a link
between the administering of the vaccine and the occurrence of the victim’s
disease, the Court of Justice ruled that this does not run contrary to Article 4 of
the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC, since this provision only sets the
burden on proof, and not the means through which proof can be established. But
the Court even went beyond answering the question that had been referred to it,
and expressly endorsed, although obiter, the above mentioned criteria that are
commonly used by French lower courts to establish causation i.e. temporal proxi-
mity between the administering of a vaccine and the occurrence of a disease, the
lack of personal and familial history of that disease, together with the existence of a
significant number of reported cases of the disease occurring following such
vaccines being administered).
The Cour de cassation’s position, however debatable, has thus been anointed by
the ECJ. The latter, though, has also made it impossible for the French higher court to
go a step further and to follow the Conseil d’État’s path, by establishing a legal rule
whereby causation must be regarded as established, if certain items of factual evidence
are presented. In effect, this means that the Cour de cassation is now stuck in the
situation it has created by its 2008 decisions: in hepatitis B vaccination cases, lower
courts are free to decide the existence of causation on the facts of the case, and their
potentially contradicting rulings cannot be harmonized by the higher court.
116 See G. CANSELIER, ‘De l’explication causale en droit de la responsabilité civile délictuelle’, RTD civ
2010, p 41, no 20.
117 ECJ, 21 June 2017, C–621/15 N. W and Others v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC and Others. For
French views on this decision, see e.g. D. 2017, p 1807, note J.-S. BORGHETTI, JCP G 2017, p 1533,
note G. VINEY.
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32 How unsatisfying this situation is has just been illustrated by the final decision
of the Cour de cassation in the very case that was the occasion of the Sanofi Pasteur
ruling of the ECJ. The claimant in this case argued that the hepatitis B vaccine was
defective and that this was the cause of his multiple sclerosis, whose first symptoms
had been diagnosed a short time after he had received the vaccine. He had won in
the first instance, but the Versailles appellate court had ruled that, even though
causation could be established on the facts of the case, the vaccine’s producer was
not liable, since the vaccine, even assuming that it could cause demyelinating
diseases, still had a positive risk/benefit balance, and was thus not defective.118
This decision was quashed by the Cour de cassation, on the issue of defectiveness,
and the case was sent back to the Paris appellate court to be decided anew.119 But
the Parisian judges, ruling on the same facts as their Versailles colleagues, took a
different view on causation, and decided that these facts did not allow the conclu-
sion that the vaccine had caused the claimant’s disease in the first case.120 The case
was then brought before the Cour de cassation for the second time, and it was then
that the higher decided to make a reference to the ECJ.121 Based on the latter’s
decision, the Cour de cassation has recently rejected the challenge against the Paris
appellate court’s ruling, since it is for the lower judges to decide, on the facts of the
case, if causation is to be regarded as established. In practice, the Sanofi Pasteur
ruling of the ECJ results in French law being locked in a stalemate of contradicting
lower courts’ decisions as far as the assessment of causation in hepatitis B vaccina-
tion cases is concerned.
4.3. Defectiveness
33 In order to succeed, claims based on Article L 3111–9 code de la santé
publique only require that causation between the vaccination and the disease be
proven. Product liability claims, on the other hand, also require proof of the
vaccine’s defectiveness. This is another major hurdle for plaintiffs. As a matter of
fact, even assuming that hepatitis B vaccination can cause demyelinating diseases,
this negative side effect cannot be considered independently from the vaccination’s
efficiency in preventing the transmission and spreading of hepatitis B.
Some French courts helped plaintiffs go around this hurdle by deciding that
hepatitis B vaccines’ producers122 had been in breach of their duty to warn and
were therefore liable for damage caused by their product, since they had not
informed the users that the vaccine could cause a demyelinating disease as a side
118 CA Versailles, 10 February 2011, no 09/07555.
119 Cass civ 1re, 26 September 2012, no 11-17738.
120 CA Paris, 7 March 2014, no 13/01546.
121 Cass civ 1re, 12 November 2015, no 14-18.118, D. 2015, p 2602, note J.-S. BORGHETTI, and 2016, p
2535, obs. J.-D. BRETZNER, JCP G 2016, p 8, note G. VINEY.
122 Vaccines against hepatitis B have been commercialized by two different producers in France.
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effect.123 Whatever the merits of this solution,124 however, it will seldom apply in
future cases, since the notices of vaccines against hepatitis B have now been
mentioning this alleged risk for some years.
In most cases, therefore, courts have had to take a stand on the hepatitis B
vaccine’s intrinsic defectiveness. The 1985 Directive gives little indication on how
this defectiveness should be assessed, as the standard set by Article 6 (‘a product is
defective when it does not provide the safety a person is entitled to expect’) is
extremely vague. There is a broad scholarly consensus in France that the legitimate
expectations test should be interpreted as meaning that a product is defective if it is
abnormally dangerous.125 The (ab)normality of a product’s danger will normally be
assessed through a comparison with other products.126 The problem with pharma-
ceuticals, however, is that they often lack comparables. It has therefore been
suggested127 that the defectiveness of pharmaceuticals should be assessed using a
risk/benefit ratio.128 Several French appellate courts have endorsed this
suggestion,129 including in hepatitis B vaccination cases.130
All of them have concluded that the vaccine against hepatitis B could not be
regarded as defective, since, even assuming that it may in certain cases cause
demyelinating diseases, its benefits to the community greatly outweigh its potential
negative side effects.131 It therefore seemed that the efforts to establish causation
123 The Cour de cassation accepted this reasoning in one case at least: Cass civ 1re, 9 July 2009, no 08-
11073.
124 This solution is actually quite debatable, for at least two reasons. First of all, it is not at all obvious
why producers should warn against side effects that are not proven, and are even extremely
doubtful. Besides, the courts in those cases did not check that the producer’s breach of duty had
had an impact on the patient’s decision to be vaccinated.
125 See e.g. J.-S. BORGHETTI, La responsabilité du fait des produits. Étude de droit comparé (Paris: L.G.
D.J. 2004) no 294; G. VINEY & P. JOURDAIN, Les conditions de la responsabilité (Paris: L.G.D.J., 3rd
edn 2006), no 774.
126 J.-S. BORGHETTI, La responsabilité du fait des produits. Étude de droit comparé, nos 331–334.
127 See e.g. G. VINEY, observations on Cass civ 1re, 23 September 2003, nos 01-13063 and 01-13064;
L. CLERC-RENAUD, ‘Quelle responsabilité en cas de dommages causés par des produits de santé?’,
Revue Lamy droit civil 2007, p 34, no 14; J.-S. BORGHETTI, ‘Quelles responsabilités pour les
laboratoires fabricants de médicaments dangereux?’, Revue générale de droit médical, special
issue ‘Les responsabilités du fait des médicaments dangereux. Perspectives nationales et
transfrontalières’, 2012, (p) 19 at 25.
128 This test obviously raises a ‘pre-emption’ problem, since it is substantially the same as the one used
by sanitary authorities before they authorize the putting into circulation of pharmaceuticals.
Proving that an authorized pharmaceutical is defective thus amounts, in most cases, to proving
that sanitary authorities have made a mistake when authorizing the product. It is difficult,
however, to find another test to assess a pharmaceutical’s defectiveness.
129 See e.g. CA Versailles, 17 March 2006, no 04/08435; CA Paris, 19 June 2009, no 06/13741.
130 See e.g. CA Versailles, 16 March 2007, no 05/09525; 29 March 2007, no 06/00496; 5 November
2007, no 06/06435.
131 See e.g. CA Versailles, 5 April 2012, no. 09/05661.
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in product liability cases were bound to remain fruitless, as even the most plaintiff-
friendly appellate courts refused to regard the vaccine against hepatitis B as
inherently defective.
34 In two cases at least, however, the Cour de cassation tried to go over this
obstacle as it has gone over the causation obstacle. On these two occasions, the
Court quashed lower courts decisions, which had recognized the existence of
causation between a vaccination and multiple sclerosis on the facts of the case,
but had nevertheless rejected the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that the risk/
benefit ratio of the vaccine was positive, and the vaccine was therefore not
defective.132 In both cases, the Cour de cassation ruled that the lower courts
could not rely only on the risk/benefit ratio to rule out defectiveness and that
they should have considered whether the elements that had been used to presume
causation could not also justify a presumption that the vaccine doses used in the
case were defective. By so doing, the Cour de cassation did not say that vaccines
against hepatitis B are defective, but it allowed lower courts to reach this conclusion
on a case-by-case basis.133 The approach is exactly the same as the one taken on
causation in 2008, and the result will also be the same. The vaccine against hepatitis B
will most likely be regarded as defective by some French lower courts, but not by
others. This is of course quite absurd, especially considering that the vaccine’s fitness
for purpose is undisputed and that its use is recommended in many countries (includ-
ing France).
Yet, the ECJ, in its Sanofi Pasteur decision, has also validated this approach.
It ruled that national courts may, on the facts of the case, use the same evidence to
conclude that there is a defect in the vaccine as they do to conclude that there is a
causal link between that defect and the claimant’s disease. In effect, this seems to
open the door to lower courts’ decisions that would regard the hepatitis B vaccine
as defective because this product has been presumed to cause a severe demyelinat-
ing disease in one given case, even though its global risk/benefit ratio remains
positive, and there is no evidence that there was something wrong specifically in
those doses of the vaccine that were used by the claimant. This, it is suggested,
would be a deplorable result. It must be said, however, that no appellate court
seems to have reached it so far.
132 Cass civ 1re, 26 September 2012, no 11-17738; 10 July 2013, no 12-21314.
133 The language of the two decisions suggests that the lower courts were criticized for having
considered only the possibility of a design defect of the vaccine, and not that of a manufacturing
defect in the doses used by the plaintiffs. However, the general context of the cases, as well as the
report of a higher magistrate in the second case (C. MELLOTTÉE, D 2013, p 2306), make it clear
that, in both cases, the plaintiffs alleged the existence of a design defect.
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5. The Vaccine Issue in the United Kingdom (Duncan Fairgrieve)
5.1. The Statutory Fund for Vaccine Damage
35 Realization of the potentiality of vaccine damage occurred relatively early in
the United Kingdom. As early as 1930, a report recorded adverse reactions to a
smallpox vaccination.134 Responses to that in terms of compensation were however
long time in coming.
It was not until the 1970s that there was an organized campaign in favour
of the granting of compensation for vaccine damage. Initially, through indivi-
dual initiatives, a parliamentary campaign,135 and even an Ombudsman inquiry.-
136 The turning point came with the establishment in December 1972 of a Royal
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury under the
chairmanship of Lord Pearson with a remit to examine to what extent, and by
what means, compensation should be payable in respect of death or personal
injury. In the ultimate report, the Pearson Royal Commission137 recommended
the introduction of strict liability for defective products. Although this general
recommendation was not put into effect,138 the more specific recommendation
to create a bespoke statutory fund for vaccine damage was followed, with the
creation of a statutory fund by virtue of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act
1979.139
The Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, and the accompanying
Regulations,140 came into force in early 1979, and allow for the provision of a
lump-sum payment for persons who are severely disabled as a result of vaccination
against specified diseases. These initially covered diphtheria, tetanus, whooping
cough, poliomyelitis, measles, rubella, tuberculosis and smallpox,141 and have been
extended to cover mumps, haemophilus influenza type b, meningitis C, pneumo-
coccal infection and human papillomavirus, pandemic influenza A (H1N1),142
134 Further Report on Post-vaccinal Nervous Disease (Cmd 3738, 1930).
135 Jack Ashley MP attempted to raise the issue of compensation for vaccine-damaged children in
Parliament in 1974: HC Deb, 31 January 1974, Vol 868, Col. 718–730.
136 Parliamentary Commission for Administration, Sixth Report for Session 1976–77, Whooping Cough
Vaccination, 26 October 1977.
137 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Cmnd 7054, 1974).
138 See further S. WHITTAKER, Liability for Products (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p 432.
139 Interestingly, on a direct comparative note, a British government Minister explained the basis of
the English fund in terms reminiscent of the French principle of égalité devant les charges
publiques : ‘the community as a whole has sought to share a responsibility for the hardship that
has fallen upon [the victims]’ (cited by C. HARLOW, Administrative Liability: A Comparative Study
of French and English Law (Thesis, University of London 1979), p 317).
140 Vaccine Damage Payments Regulations 1979.
141 S. 1(2) of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979.
142 Up to 31 August 2010.
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rotavirus, influenza,143 meningitis W and meningitis B.144 In the UK, there are no
mandatory vaccines.
Under this scheme, the vaccination must have occurred in the UK,145 and
(with some exceptions),146 the vaccination must have occurred when the claimant
was either under eighteen or during an outbreak of the disease in the UK or the Isle
of Man.147 It extends also to unborn children whose mother was vaccinated for one
of those diseases.148 The scheme is premised on no-fault liability so there is no
requirement to show negligence or any other type of fault on the part of the
authorities.149 The original sum under the Act of £10,000 has been increased
over the years to an amount of now £120,000.150
5.2. The Proof of Causation
36 The issue of causation has for a long time been a thorny one.151 As Richard
Goldberg has noted, the failure rates, for lack of the requisite causal link, are
high.152 Following a recent Freedom of Information Request made by the author,
the Department for Work & Pensions indicated that since 1979, there had been
6,196 claims, of which 936 resulted in awards.153 There have been 4,177 rejections
on the basis that ‘causation due to vaccination has not been accepted’, and 125
where ‘causation [is] accepted but resulting disablement [is] not severe (less than
60%).’154 The other main reason for rejection was that claims were received outside
the statutory time limit for making a claim,155 with 587 thereby rejected.
143 Except for influenza caused by a pandemic influenza virus: Vaccine Damage Payments (Specified
Disease) Ord. 2015, s. 2 (2015, No 47).
144 Vaccine Damage Payments (Specified Disease) Ord. 2016, s. 2 (2016, No 454).
145 Or to serving members of the armed forces, their spouse and their dependent children who were
vaccinated elsewhere as part of armed service medical facilities.
146 Poliomyelitis, rubella, meningitis C, human papillomavirus, pandemic influenza A (H1N1), and
meningitis W (before 26th birthday).
147 S. 2(1) of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979.
148 S. 1(3) of the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979.
149 For discussion of such statutory schemes, see D. FAIRGRIEVE, State Liability in Tort: A Comparative
Law Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), Ch. 8.
150 Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979 Statutory Sum Ord. 2007.
151 R. GOLDBERG, Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013), p 11.
152 Ibid.
153 FOI 2141 dated 31 May 2017.
154 FOI 2141 dated 31 May 2017.
155 I.e. the later of: the date on which the disabled person attains the age of 21; and the end of the
period of six years beginning with the date of the vaccination to which the claim relates (Vaccine
Damage Payments Act 1979, S. 3(1)(c).)
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5.3. The Defectiveness of the Vaccine
37 Rather than pursuing a claim under the statutory scheme, those affected
can of course bring an action against the manufacturer of the vaccine. Such
litigation faces significant obstacles in the law, in particular in terms of showing
that the vaccine caused the loss,156 and that the product in question was
defective (for claims brought under the Consumer Protection Act 1987). As
for defectiveness, the practical test laid down in the Directive of whether a
product ‘does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect’ has
raised difficulties,157 and the case law that there has been at a European level
has left many questions unanswered.158 One recurrent issue is whether within
this entitled expectations test there is a role for considerations of risk/utility. In
the US, the risk/utility test has played a prominent role, involving the balancing
of the probability and seriousness of harm against the cost of taking precau-
tions. As explained by Owen, in the US, ‘a product is considered “defective”
under a risk-utility test if the costs of eliminating a particular hazard are less
than the resulting safety benefits.’159
38 The relevance of such considerations in a European context is the subject of
some debate. From one perspective, the opportunities for the deployment of risk-
utility considerations would seem quite limited: it is quite difficult to see how the
utility of a product is a relevant consideration when assessing defectiveness within
the meaning of Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive. Moreover, the recitals of
the Directive give a centrality to the notion of a ‘fair apportionment of risks’,160 as
has been underlined in the case law,161 rather than the cold calculation of costs and
benefits enshrined in the US risk/utility calculus. Indeed, the American experience
shows that once risk/utility is adopted, the ultimate test inevitably becomes close to
that of a negligence-style analysis. That would be problematic in a European
156 See e.g. Bonthrone v. Millan, Scottish Court of Session, 10 October 1981, unreported (claim by
child with serious brain damage failed); Loveday v. Renton (No 1) (1989) 1 Med LR 117, QBD
(judge held that the plaintiff had failed to prove on the balance of probability that pertussis vaccine
can cause permanent brain damage in young children). See analysis of these cases in R. LEE,
‘Vaccine Damage: Adjudicating Scientific Dispute’, in G. Howells (ed.), Product Liability,
Insurance and the Pharmaceutical Industry (Manchester University Press, Fulbright Papers, Vol
9, 1990) p 52 ff. Causation issues also proved fatal to the MMR litigation in the late 1990s/2000s.
157 Indeed, the European Commission has admitted in its Third Report on the Directive that ‘[t]he
subjective nature of the “expectations” test means that this principle is incapable of precise
definition’, see COM(2006) 496, p 10.
158 ECJ, 5 March 2015, joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH
v. AOK Sachsen-Anhalt - Die Gesundheitskasse.
159 D.G. OWEN, Products Liability Law (3rd edn, St. Paul: Thomson/West 2014) p 301.
160 See Recitals 2 and 7.
161 ECJ, 5 March 2015, joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH
v. AOK Sachsen-Anhalt - Die Gesundheitskasse, at para. 42.
91
context, given that the standard of defect in the Directive should not require proof
of fault.162 On the other hand, it has been argued that it is difficult to exclude risk-
utility factors entirely, particularly in pharma cases.163 It should also not be
forgotten that members of the English judiciary have been reared on the traditional
common law diet of cost-benefit analyses in negligence, and this was perhaps
reflected in the recent decision of Wilkes v. Depuy International,164 in which the
Court departed from the approach in earlier cases165 and endorsed a role for risk/
benefit analysis amongst the basket of factors considered within the defectiveness
standard,166 at least in a standard case.167
39 From the perspective of causation, it is difficult to speculate on the exact
approach of the courts in vaccine cases in the absence of any recent case law on the
issue. However, Richard Goldberg has argued that the US case law is useful in
determining the relevant standards for showing general and specific causation in
vaccine cases:168
‘This legal standard of proof for causation in fact under the Program was
elaborated on in the leading case of Althen v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services.169 There, the Federal Circuit established three factors which had to be
satisfied to overcome the burden of proof, viz: (1) a medical theory causally
connecting the vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence of cause and
effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and (3) a showing
of a proximate temporal relationship between the vaccination and the injury.’
In the United Kingdom, the most high-profile vaccination litigation brought
in recent times was the ill-fated MMR vaccination claims, arising out of the alleged
link between the administering of the MMR vaccine and the subsequent develop-
ment of autism and gastrointestinal problems in children.170 After the scientific
basis for the link was discredited, the public funding of the claims was withdrawn
162 There is clear textual evidence in favour of the creation of a no-fault liability regime: this may be
inferred from Arts 1 and 6 of the Directive. The Recitals confirm this fact explicitly.
163 M. MILDRED, ‘Pharmaceutical Products: The Relationship between Regulatory Approval and the
Existence of a Defect’, EBLR (European Business Law Review) 2007, p 1267.
164 Wilkes v. Depuy International Limited [2016] EWHC 3096 (QBD).
165 A v. National Blood Authority and another [2001] 3 All ER 289 (QBD), in which Burton J held that
along with avoidability and the impracticability of taking precautionary measures, the benefit to
society or the utility of the product was not legally relevant.
166 See Wilkes v. Depuy International Limited [2016] EWHC 3096 at paras 65–67, 82, 93–96.
167 At para. 96, the Judge remarked that in a ‘non-standard’ (out of specification) case, the risk-benefit
of an in-specification product is unlikely to have much if any weight. He did not, however, advocate
a rule of law that it should have none.
168 R. Goldberg, ‘Vaccine Damage and Causation: Franco-American comparaison’, 1 Journal de Droit
de la Santé & de l’assurance Maladie (2014), p (134) at 135.
169 Althen v. Secretary of Health & Human Services 418 F 3d 1274 (Fed Cir 2005).
170 For a detailed appraisal, see R. Goldberg, Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation, Ch. 6.
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on the basis that the litigation had no reasonable prospect of success, and the status
as group litigation was brought to an end in June 2007.171
6. Conclusion (Duncan Fairgrieve)
40 It will be readily apparent from the foregoing that the initial hypothesis
provided at the start of this article has been confirmed in the sense that in all the
systems studied, there are a plurality of routes to a remedy in case of vaccine
damage. These moreover seem to follow quite a similar typology in all the systems:
over and above the orthodox regimes of tort law and product liability (and in
Germany the Pharmaceuticals Act), a bespoke (and often) statutory compensation
scheme is available, whereby compensation is provided by a scheme which is
subject to procedural and substantive rules which are more flexible than under
the orthodox civil law approach. The procedural rules under such a scheme gen-
erally allow victims to gain compensation direct from the relevant fund rather than
having to suffer the litigant’s lot of fighting litigation through the courts.
Importantly, the substantive rules are often more accommodating for the claimants
so that typically all that needs to be shown is a vaccination, subsequent injury and
the causal link between the two. This is all underpinned, as noted at the outset, by
reasons of social solidarity according to which the fact that an individual has to
suffer a sacrifice (vaccine damage) for the benefit of the community (reduction in
serious disease due to public programme of immunization), then the public purse
should provide compensation to him or her.
41 The second area of importance identified at the outset of this article would also
seem to have been confirmed by the research results presented above, namely the
pertinence of analysing vaccine cases from an orthodox tort/product liability perspec-
tive. Such cases pose particular challenges for the ordinary civil law rules, concentrat-
ing within this sphere some of the most critical issues facing products claims, namely
the composite elements of defectiveness and the difficulties of proving causation in
healthcare cases, where many competing factors are necessarily involved.
42 In terms of defect, the correct interpretation of the relevant test is of crucial
importance. As ever in medicinal cases, a key parameter is how far that global risk/
utility considerations are relevant to the test under the Directive. Views have
already been expressed on this issue in all of the systems studied above, showing
a variety of perspectives albeit that English, French and German case law seemingly
take into account such considerations. This approach was however strongly chal-
lenged by Eleonora Rajneri in her section on Italian law above, in which she argues
that, though it might be understandable to avoid inhibiting innovation in the
171 Sayers v. Smithkline Beecham Plc [2007] EWHC 1335. For a detailed appraisal, see R. Goldberg,
Medicinal Product Liability and Regulation Ch. 6.
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vaccine sphere, it is also important to take account of the fact that manufacturers
are in a highly protected position due to the specific market conditions relating to
vaccines, which are favourable to producers. Therefore there are neither econom-
ical or legal reasons to insulate the vaccines producer from the strict liability
regime put in place by the European directive, through a duplication of the same
risk/utility test already applied by the Regulator. Certainly, it would seem that
manufacturers are in a position to be able to factor into the price of the product the
costs of compensating the limited number of vaccine damage cases. In such condi-
tions, it is not necessarily evident that that loss should be automatically shifted to
the public purse by means of the statutory schemes mentioned above.
The arguments protecting the producers are perhaps finely balanced but it
does seem that the law, particularly at an EU level, is moving in the direction of
Eleonora Rajneri’s position. In the Boston Scientific decision, the ECJ took the
position that the particular products implanted (pacemaker and ICD) had an
‘abnormal potential for damage’ and were defective because they belonged to a
group or production series of products which had been shown to have a signifi-
cantly higher than normal risk of such a fault. Though it thus conceptualized the
defect standard in terms of risk, the Court did not seem to consider it necessary to
weigh that risk up against the product’s benefits or wider societal utility of the
product. Whilst it might be said that Boston Scientific concerned a very different
fact pattern, the recent ECJ decision in Sanofi Pasteur is, as has already been seen,
specifically concerned with this issue.172 In that case, the Advocate General speci-
fically examined the argument (on the part of Sanofi) that the test of defectiveness
required a broad assessment of the cost/benefits of the product, going beyond the
concrete case.173 The Advocate General explicitly said that he disagreed with that
proposition opining that the test of defectiveness ‘essentially refers to baseline
expectations of the product under normal conditions of use. It does not mean
that where the product is used normally and causes serious harm in an individual
case, that a conclusion of defectiveness necessarily requires a balancing of the costs
and benefits of the product.’174 Such an approach would result in the court ‘creat-
ing (or at least boldly deducing) new conditions of liability.’175
The indications are that the Court followed this analysis of defect. In defin-
ing what it is necessary for the claimant to show in proving defect in the context of
a vaccine case, the ECJ states that this requires that the vaccine ‘causes abnormal
and particularly serious damage to the patient who, in the light of the nature and
function of the product, is entitled to expect a particularly high level of safety.’176
172 ECJ, 21 June 2017, Case C-621/15 v. N. W and Others v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC and Others.
173 Ibid., para. 85.
174 Ibid., para. 87.
175 Ibid., para. 88.
176 Ibid., para. 41.
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There is no reference to a weighing of risk with a wider societal benefit, and thus
the Court seems to apply the defect notion in a way which excludes the risk/benefit
equation.
43 Similarly, in respect of causation the sphere of vaccine damages poses some
challenges, since very often there is not unequivocal scientifical evidence of the fact
that the vaccine was the cause of the disease. The vaccine could be at the most one
plausible cause among several others. Questioned about the definition of causality
and its proof, the recent decision of the ECJ leaves its ascertainment to the
individual Member States, following the principle of procedural autonomy.
Because none of the legal systems taken into account allows the apportionment
of the liability according to the percentage of probability that the vaccine was
actually the cause of the disease, it is required to prove that the vaccine was the
most probable cause compared to the others, in order to hold the producer liable.
In all the systems, proof can be given through presumptions and the presumptions
are everywhere inferred from the absence of any other probable cause of the disease
and from the temporal proximity between the vaccination and the emergence of the
symptoms. However, while in France and Germany the temporal proximity is about
three months, in Italy a lapse of time of three years was considered relevant. This
anomaly may be explained by the fact that in the Italian case there was one further
element supporting the presumption that the vaccine was the most probable cause
of the disease. In fact, the internal document of the vaccine producer shows that
batches of this vaccine contained mercury, which is a toxic substance particularly in
respect of young children. Further, the Italian decision concerned a claim for
redress provided by the public compensation fund, i.e. a claim where the social
solidarity issues are very prominent. In conclusion, the comparative studies show
that the elasticity and the ambiguity of the notion of causality allows the courts to
adapt it according to the peculiar issues that are the guidelines in the different type
of claims.
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